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NOTES
Reversal of Fortunato:* Textualism
Un-Dunn in State v. Dunn
Rules ofprocedure are a necessarypart of an orderly system of
justice. Their efficacy, however, depends upon the willingness
of the courts to enforce them according to their terms.
Changes in rules whose inflexibility has turned out to work
hardshipshould be effected by the process of amendment, not
by ad hoc relaxationsby this Court in particularcases. Such
dispensations in the long run actually produce mischievous
results, undermining the certainty of the rules and causing
confusion among the lower courts and the bar.
The Honorable Tom C. Clark'
INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, textualists have defended their position
on the battlefield of American jurisprudence against the advance-

ment of public-policy interpretations. 2 On August 6, 1997, Judge
Stephen Fortunato of the Rhode Island Superior Court, perhaps
*

This title lampoons the well-known title of a book about another

noteworthy Rhode Island case. Alan Dershowitz, Reversal of Fortune (Random
House 1986) (chronicling State v. Von Bulow, 475 A-2d 995 (R.I. 1984)).
Technically, Judge Fortunato did not reverse his original verdict. He overturned
his verdict and granted the defendant a new trial.
1. Thompson v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 375 U.S. 384, 389
(1964) (Clark, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
2. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 2 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); Maryland v. Craig, 497
U.S. 836 (1990). The majority and dissenting opinions in Calder and Craigevince
this ongoing debate's durability. In Calder,Justice Chase wrote the majority opinion favoring a policy-based interpretation; Justice Iredell, in dissent, favored textualism. In Craig, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, favored a policybased interpretation; Justice Scalia, in dissent, favored textualism. But see, e.g.,
State of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469 (1992); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.
1012 (1988). Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion favoring a textualist interpretation in Cowart. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Coy, similarly
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inadvertently, took up arms and joined this struggle on the side of
policy-based interpretations. The attack began on June 24, 1997,
when Judge Fortunato convicted a former catholic priest, Monsignor Louis Ward Dunn, of first-degree sexual assault. 3 On August
6, 1997, however, Judge Fortunato, relying heavily on public-policy
justifications, derogated Rhode Island Superior Court Rule of
Criminal Procedure 33,4 overturned his June 24th verdict and
granted Dunn a new trial.5
After his conviction, Dunn had moved for a new trial. In the
interest of justice, Dunn based his motion for a new trial on the
insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. 6 Judge Fortunato, however, granted the new-trial motion on his own particular grounds, rather than on the grounds presented by the
defendant. Judge Fortunato's particular grounds for the new-trial
motion were newly-discovered evidence and "in the interest of justice," ineffectiveness of counsel.7 His decision evoked a public
firestorm, bringing protestors to the steps of the superior court and
sending shockwaves throughout Rhode Island's legal community.8
argued in favor of textualism. Arguing for policy-based interpretations, Justice
Blackmun wrote the dissenting opinions in both cases.
In addition, proponents of textualism can be found beyond the confines of
American jurisprudence. Porcia's judgment against Shylock in Shakespeare's The
Merchant of Venice is illustrative:
A pound of that same merchant's flesh is thine.
The court awards it, and the law doth give it ....
And you must cut this flesh from off his breast.
The law allows it, and the law doth give it ....
Tarry a little. There is something else.
This bond doth give thee here no jot of blood.
The words expressly are 'a pound of flesh'.
Take then thy bond. Take thou thy pound of flesh.
But in the cutting it, if thou dost shed
One drop of Christian blood, thy lands and goods
Are by the laws of Venice confiscate
Unto the state of Venice.
William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice act 4, sc. 1.
3. See Record, State v. Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. June 24, 1997) (No. 96-1005A).
4. Rule 33 sets out the procedural requirements for a motion for a new trial.
5. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial, State v. Dunn (R.I. Super.

Ct. Aug. 6, 1997) (No. 96-1005A).
6. See Defendant's Motion for a New Trial, State v. Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct.
June 30, 1997) (No. 96-1005A).
7. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial, Dunn, passim (No. 961005A).
8. See Judge Criticized in Rape Case, 18 R.I. Laws. Wkly., Aug. 18, 1997, at
234 (discussing the public backlash to Judge Fortunato's decision to overturn his
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In response to this criticism, Judge Fortunato simply said "read
the decision." 9
Thus began a legal search to inquire whether Judge Fortunato
could lawfully overturn his own decision by using his own particular grounds to grant the defendant's motion for a new trial, rather
than those supplied by the defendant. The touchstones of this inquiry are the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and sections 8-6-2 and 10-9.1-1 of the Rhode Island General
Laws. Section 8-6-2 grants a majority of superior court judges the
power to make court rules;' 0 section 10-9.1-1 governs motions for
post-conviction relief." The Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of
Criminal Procedure, most notably Rules 1 and 2, were designed to
create uniformity and predictability in litigation. 12 In line with
that purpose, Rule 33 governs motions for a new trial. 1 3
Although Judge Fortunato advances several policy-based arguments to support his actions, these policy arguments do not justify altering Rule 33 in any manner except through a majority of
the superior court judges.' 4 This Note asserts that Judge Fortunato exceeded his authority and violated not only the text but
also the policy behind Rule 33 when he overturned his prior verprior conviction); Laura Meade Kirk, Reversal of Priest'sConviction Shocks Many
in Legal Community, Prov. J. Bull., Aug. 10, 1997, at AS, available in 1997 WL
10848465; Elizabeth Rau, ProtestersPlead Case Against Fortunato,Prov. J. Bull.,
Sept. 22, 1997, at Bi, available in 1997 WL 13865312 (describing protestors who
carried signs reading, for example, "a Dunn deal?," "[rletire the fan-mail judge"
and "[t]he judicial system in Rhode Island is for sale").
9. Charles M. Bakst, Reading Fortunato'sDecision in Dunn Case Will Still
Leave You Baffled, Prov. J. Bull., Aug. 24, 1997, at B1, available in 1997 WL
10849431 (describing Judge Fortunato's August 6th decision as unconvincing); see
also Karen Lee Ziner, ProtestersRally Against Reversal of Dunn Rape Verdict,
Prov.J. Bull., Aug. 18, 1997, at Al, availablein 1997 WL 10848251 (discussing the
protestors' criticism of Judge Fortunato's decision).
10. R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-6-2 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
11. R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-1 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
12. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 1 ("These rules govern the procedure.., in all
criminal proceedings in the Superior Court.... ."); id. 2 ("These rules... shall be
construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay."); see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-6-2
("In prescribing such rules, the court shall have regard to the simplification of the
system of pleading, practice, and procedure in the courts in which the rules shall
apply in order to promote the speedy determination of litigation on the merits;
13. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33.
14. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-6-2 (providing that a majority of the superior court
shall promulgate court rules).
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dict. He should have denied Dunn's original motion and provided
the defendant with the opportunity to amend his motion for a new
trial or make a motion for post-conviction relief.
Part I of this Note describes the factual and procedural background as well as the reasoning of Judge Fortunato's June 24th
verdict and his August 6th opinion granting the motion for a new
trial. Part II discusses in detail Rule 33 and section 10-9.1-1 of the
Rhode Island General Laws governing post-conviction relief. Part
III analyzes Judge Fortunato's August 6th opinion within both textual and policy constructs of Rule 33 and demonstrates that he exceeded his authority. Part IV assumes arguendo that Judge
Fortunato had the authority to grant a new trial on his own motion. It then examines (1) whether newly-discovered evidence existed to warrant a new trial and (2) whether the defense attorney's
performance was so ineffective as to warrant a new trial in the interest of justice. Hypothetically, Part IV concludes that, if he had
the power to grant a new trial sua sponte, then Judge Fortunato
would not have succeeded on either ground.
I. STATE V. DUNNc
A. Factualand ProceduralBackground
The State of Rhode Island filed a two-count indictment in
Rhode Island Superior Court charging Louis Ward Dunn with
first-degree sexual assault. 15 Count One pertained to an incident
which had occurred thirty-two years earlier in 1965 involving
Dunn, a Roman Catholic priest, and a parishioner named Lucille
Farr. 16 Judge Fortunato granted Dunn's motion for acquittal on
Count One. 17 Count Two stemmed from a 1982 incident involving
the defendant, still a Roman Catholic priest, and Mary Ryan, one
of his parishioners.' 8
In Count Two, the State charged Dunn under section 11-37-2
of the Rhode Island General Laws. 19 Section 11-37-2 provides
that:
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See
See
See
See
See

Record, State v. Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. June 24, 1997) (No. 96-1005A).
id. at 212-13.
id. at 221.
id.
id.; see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2 (1979) (providing the applicable

statutory law regarding first-degree sexual assault).
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a person is guilty of first degree sexual assault if he or she
engages in sexual penetration with another person, not the
spouse of the accused, and if any of the following circumstances exist[:] ... the accused knows or has reason to know
that the victim is mentally incapacitated, mentally defective
or physically helpless . . . [or] the accused uses force or
20
coercion.

The State, which carries the burden of proving every element of
the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, 2 1 argued that Dunn used
force when engaging in sexual intercourse with Ryan. 2 2 In de23
fense, Dunn argued that the sexual intercourse was consensual.
He waived his right to a jury trial 24 and chose not to testify on his
25
own behalf.
The relevant statutory definition of sexual penetration is "any
...
intrusion, however slight, by any part of a person's body...
into the genital.., openings of another person's body."26 The force
involved in first-degree sexual assault need not be brutal or violent
but must be greater than that which is employed during the normal act of sexual intercourse. 2 7 Also, the court may infer coercion
from the circumstances surrounding a relationship where the accused occupies a position of power in relation to the accuser. 2
Based on the above criterion, Judge Fortunato found Dunn guilty
29
under Count Two of the indictment.
B.

The Original Verdict

Judge Fortunato began his opinion by commending the attor30
neys for their professional and non-inflammatory presentations.
The court then considered the primary issue of whether Dunn used
force to commit the sexual act, thus violating section 11-37-2; a corollary to that issue was whether consent and/or resistance oc20. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2.
21. See State v. Mora, 618 A.2d 1275, 1280 (R.I. 1993); State v. Lamoureux,
573 A.2d 1176, 1179 (R.I. 1990).
22. See Record at 252, Dunn (No. 96-1005A).
23. See id. at 259.
24. See id. at 254.
25. See id. at 262.
26. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1 (1979).
27. See State v. St. Amant, 536 A.2d 897, 900 (R.I. 1988).
28. See id.
29. See Record at 262-63, Dunn (No. 96-1005A).
30. Id. at 251,
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curred.3 1 In determining "resistance," the court considered the
surrounding circumstances. 32 Judge Fortunato asserted that the
following surrounding circumstances existed: Dunn became
Ryan's parental surrogate, Dunn knew of Ryan's past history of
sexual abuse at her father's hands and Dunn began a pattern of
sexual predations against her until Ryan, at age sixteen or seventeen, succumbed to his advances. 33 Sexual activity between the
two then continued for three or four years, culminating with the
34
night that gave rise to the alleged crime.
Although Judge Fortunato neither penalized the defense for
failing to present character evidence nor drew adverse inferences
regarding Dunn's failure to testify on his own behalf, the testimony
of Mary Ryan and other state witnesses remained unimpeached.3 5
Accordingly, Judge Fortunato determined that on the evening in
question, despite Ryan's resistance, Dunn used force to insert the
head of his penis into her vagina.3 6 Judge Fortunato therefore, on
June 24th, found Dunn guilty of first-degree sexual assault, a capital offense. 37 On June 30th, Dunn's counsel, Bruce Vealey, in accordance with Rule 33, filed a motion for a new trial in the interest
of justice on the grounds that the court's decision was against the
law, against the evidence and against the law and the evidence
and the weight thereof.38 Judge Fortunate held two conferences,
one on July 28th and the other on August 5th, to consider this newtrial motion. 39
31. See id. at 257.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 258-59 (stating, in response to Dunn's consent claim, that Dunn
clearly engaged in psychological coercion to prey upon Ryan, as "he took advantage
of his priestly collar and his role within her life, not to mention his knowledge
gained as a confidant about her prior history").
34. See id. at 254.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 260.
37. See Record at 262-63, Dunn (No. 96-1005A).
38. See Defendant's Motion for a New Trial, State v. Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct.
June 30, 1997) (No. 96-1005A); see also R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim P. 33 (providing the
basis for making a motion for a new trial).
39. The judge placed these conferences on the record so that the Rhode Island
Supreme Court would have an adequate basis to review his ruling if the State
appealed. The Attorney General and defense counsel Bruce Vealey attended both
conferences. Steven Famiglietti, counsel for Vealey, attended one conference. See
Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 9 app. at 321, State v. Dunn (R.I.
Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 1997) (No. 96-1005A) (referring to the chambers-conference par-
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The Opinion Granting The Motion for a New Trial

On August 6th, Judge Fortunato, in the interest of providing
Dunn with a fair trial leading to a just result, granted the motion
for a new trial. 40 Rather than grant the motion on the particular
grounds offered in Dunn's motion, however, Judge Fortunato supplied his own grounds: (1) newly-discovered evidence and (2) ineffective assistance of defense counsel. 4 1 Judge Fortunato claimed
that, because defense counsel Vealey had no prior experience in
representing alleged felons, Vealey incorrectly chose to forsake valuable character evidence. 4 2 Moreover, his inexperience negatively
influenced his advice on two strategic decisions: (1) Dunn's waiver
of a jury trial and (2) Dunn's decision not to take the stand. 43
The first ground Judge Fortunato supplied for granting the
motion was newly-discovered character evidence. Judge Fortunato
referred to his post-trial receipt of numerous letters describing
Dunn not as a forceful or violent person but rather as a kind, humble, generous and gentle man. 4 He characterized these letters as
"a treasure trove of material... that could be placed before a Court
as evidence going to the presence or absence of force." 4 5 Judge Fortunato determined that, because the defense did not present any of
this readily available character evidence rebutting the claim of
force, Mary Ryan's damaging testimony against Dunn remained
uncontradicted and unimpeached. 46 Had it been introduced,
Judge Fortunato reasoned, his earlier verdict may have been different. In any event, Judge Fortunato concluded that this new evidence undermined his confidence in his earlier verdict. 4 7
As his second supplied ground for granting the motion, Judge
Fortunato claimed that defense counsel Vealey was ineffective.
ticipants). Dunn was not present at any of the conferences. See Interview with
Bruce Vealey, Esq., in Greenville, R.I. (Nov. 12, 1997).
40. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 31 app. at 332, Dunn (No.
96-1005A).
41. See id. passim.
42. See id. at 23 app. at 328.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 6-8 app. at 320-21.
45. Id. at 7 app. at 320 (citing Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 409 (1948)
(supporting the value of this type of character evidence)). Judge Fortunato stated
that, "in some circumstances, [such testimony alone] may be enough to raise a
reasonable doubt of guilt." Id. at 11 app. at 322.
46. See id. at 14 app. at 323-24.
47. See id. at 29-30 app. at 331-32.
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His reasoning was twofold. First, referring to the newly-discovered character evidence, Judge Fortunate stated that Vealey did
not sufficiently investigate whether those character witnesses
would be credible or withstand cross-examination. 48 Second,
Vealey did not possess the requisite experience to act as counsel in
a capital or major felony case. 49 Thus, he lacked the legal expertise to assess the value of the character evidence and negatively
advised Dunn on whether to waive his right to a jury trial or
whether to take the witness stand.50
In response to Judge Fortunato's decision, the State argued
that a party may only bring ineffectiveness claims on a motion for
post-conviction relief.5 1 However, Judge Fortunato felt an "over52
riding responsibility" to ensure the trial process's integrity.
Thus, he was obliged to raise issues that may call into question the

48. See id. at 15 app. at 324 (quoting American Bar Association Standard 44.1).
[I]t is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading to facts relevant
to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of the conviction...
the duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions or
statements to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt or the accused's stated
desire to plead guilty.
Id.
49. See id. at 19, 31 app. at 326, 332, Dunn (No. 96-1005A); see also Executive
Order No. 95-02 (1994-1995) R.I. (643-657 A.2d) LXXII (1995) (prescribing the requirements for attorneys representing indigent clients). Executive Order 95-01,
cited in Judge Fortunato's opinion, represents a correction of a typographic error.
Executive Order 95-02 at LXIV provides the substantive text.
See also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665 n.38 (1984) (stating that
the Supreme Court has deferred to the states to set appropriate standards for administering justice more effectively when, for instance, defense counsel's ineffectiveness deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amendment rights).
50. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 23 app. at 328, Dunn (No.
96-1005A).
51. See State's Memorandum Responding to the Decision Granting Motion for
a New Trial at 1, State v. Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 1997) (No. 96-1005A); see
also R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-1 (1956) (1997 Reenactment) (describing the procedure for post-conviction relief); State v. Heath, 665 A.2d 1336, 1337-38 (R.I. 1995)
(holding that one may only bring claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in postconviction relief proceedings); infra section I.D (discussing the State's position that
post-conviction relief is the more appropriate procedure for claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel).
52. Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 25 app. at 329, Dunn (No. 961005A).
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verdict's reliability and significantly impact the trial's integrity. 53
Judge Fortunato claimed that he could raise these issues sua
sponte via a new-trial motion as long as a fully-developed record
describing his reasoning existed for possible appellate-court review. 54 Although Rule 33 requires that a judge in a non-jury trial
must vacate the judgement if entered, take additional testimony
and direct the entry of a new judgment, 5 5 Judge Fortunate forwent
these procedures. 56 He reasoned that the judiciary's goal is to conduct fair trials that reach just results. Moreover, the Rule 33 procedure for new-trial motions brought after a bench trial was "not
an apt one."5 7 He therefore granted Dunn a new trial on the fore-

going grounds. 58
D. The State's Memorandum Responding to the Decision to
Grant the Motion for a New Trial
In its memorandum responding to Judge Fortunato's August
6th opinion, the State criticized Judge Fortunato's decision. This
criticism was twofold. First, the State argued that claims of inef53. See id. at 25 app. at 329 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970) (emphasizing the trial judge's role in ensuring that attorneys who represent
criminal defendants in court maintain proper performance standards)); see also
A.B.A. Standard 6-1.1 (incorporating McMann's theory that "[t]he adversary nature of the proceeding does not relieve the trial judge of the obligation of raising on
his or her initiative at all appropriate times and in an appropriate manner, matters which may significantly promote a just determination of the trial"); Opinion
Granting Motion for a New Trial at 24 app. at 329, Dunn (No. 96-1005A) (citing
William Schwarzer, Dealing With Incompetent Counsel-The Trial Judge's Role,
93 Harv. L. Rev. 633 (supporting the trial judge's ability to ensure, through timely
intervention, a fair trial and just outcome when it appears that an attorney has
ineffectively represented a defendant)).
54. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 26 app. at 329-30, Dunn
(No. 96-1005A) ("[Tihat is why we have a record in this case, as to the background
and the concerns of the court regarding this, at which time the attorneys involved
could, where appropriate, be questioned or where appropriate, ask questions.").
55. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33.
56. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 25-26 app. at 329-30,
Dunn (No. 96-1005A).
57. Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 31 app. at 332, Dunn (No. 961005A); see also R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33 (providing the qualifications for newtrial motions made after bench trials); infra notes 105-106 (discussing Judge Fortunato's argument against applying the post-conviction relief option).
58. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 31 app. at 332, Dunn (No.
96-1005A).
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fectiveness of counsel are reserved for post-conviction relief.5 9
Therefore, bringing an ineffectiveness claim as grounds for a new
trial is premature. 60 The State reasoned that the post-conviction
relief proceedings provide both sides with the specific procedural
rights needed when arguing complex issues such as counsel's effectiveness. 6 1 Second, the State defended Vealey's decision not to put
on certain character witnesses as a tactical choice which did not
62
fall to the level of ineffectiveness.
II.

DUNN'S POST-TRIAL OPTIoNs

A. Motion for a New Trial
Rule 33 of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure governs motions for a new trial:
The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to
the defendant if required in the interest ofjustice, except that
a new trial may not be granted for error of law occurring at
the trial. If trial was by the court without a jury the court on
motion of a defendant for a new trial may vacate the judgment if entered, take additional testimony and direct the entry of a new judgment. A motion for a new trial based on the
ground of newly-discovered evidence may be made only before
or within two (2) years after entry of judgment by the court,
but if an appeal is pending the court may grant the motion
only on remand of the case. A motion for a new trial based on
any other grounds shall be made within ten (10) days after
59. See State's Memorandum Responding to the Decision Granting Motion for
a New Trial at 1, 2, 4, Dunn (No. 96-1005A) (asserting that, under the plain meaning of Rhode Island Rule 33, a judge may not move for a new trial, questions of
effective assistance of counsel are questions of law and a judge may not grant a
new trial on questions of law occurring at trial).
60. See id. at 1.
61. "The court has correctly held that such proceedings provide the only appropriate vehicle for litigating the frequently complex issues raised in claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. at 3; see also supra section II.B (discussing
the post-conviction relief proceeding); R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-7 (1956) (1997 Reen-

actment) (delineating the specific procedural rights afforded both parties in a postconviction relief hearing).
62. See State's Memorandum Responding to the Decision Granting Motion for
a New Trial at 8, 9, Dunn (No. 96-1005A) (arguing that sound trial strategy is not
open to an ineffectiveness claim).
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verdict or finding of guilty or within such further time as the
court may fix during the ten-day period.6 3
In Rhode Island, a defendant may motion the court for a new
trial in the interest of justice or on the basis of newly-discovered
evidence. 64 A party must file a motion based on newly-discovered
evidence within two years after entry of judgment. 6 5 A motion requesting a new trial in the interest of justice "shall be made within
ten... days after verdict or finding of guilty or within such further
time as the court may fix during the ten-day period."6 6 In bench
trials, the trial judge may, on motion of the defendant, vacate the
judgment if entered, take additional testimony and direct the entry
67
of a new judgment.
B.

Post-Conviction Relief

Post-conviction relief provides the defendant with an opportunity to claim that his conviction violated his constitutional
rights. 68 Section 10-9.1-1 of the Rhode Island General Laws sets
out the procedure for obtaining post-conviction relief.69 As opposed to a Rule 33 new-trial motion, post-conviction relief, via sec63. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33 (providing that "a copy of the motion for a
new trial shall be filed with the trial justice contemporaneously with its filing with
the clerk of the court").
64. See State v. Scurry, 636 A.2d 719, 724 (R.I. 1994).
65. See R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33.
66. Id.
67. See id.; see also John A. MacFadyen & Barbara Hurst, Rhode Island Criminal Procedure, § 33.6, at 324 (stating that, although Rule 33 does not state
whether, in bench trials, the grounds upon which a judge may take the above action is limited to the interests of justice, such a limitation would seem implied).
Even though a party may bring a motion for a new trial in a case tried without a
jury, the motion has limited effectiveness. In such instances, the defendant is afforded the opportunity to convince the judge that his factual findings were wrong.
See State v. Champagne, 668 A.2d 311, 313 (R.I. 1995) (discussing the limitations
of a new-trial motion after a bench trial).
68. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-1 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
69. Id.
Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime, a violation of law, or a violation of probationary or deferred sentence status and
who claims: (1) Itlhat the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the
constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state
...may institute, without paying a filing fee, a proceeding under this
chapter to secure relief. (b) This remedy is not a substitute for nor does it
affect any remedy incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of direct
review of the sentence or conviction.
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tion 10-9.1-1, provides both sides with important procedural
safeguards. Specifically, a party shall bring a motion for post-conviction relief in the court where the judgment of conviction was
entered. 70 That court then provides a hearing where it may receive evidence in the form of affidavits, depositions or oral testimony. At this hearing, the applicant has the burden of proving his
claim, the court must make specific findings of fact and conclusions
of law, and any ground not raised in the motion is deemed
waived. 7 1 An appeal may be taken from the court's decision to the
appropriate appellate court. 7 2 In addition, with respect to a claim
that his counsel was ineffective, a defendant need not rely solely on
the events occurring at trial. Rather, the defendant may present
73
outside evidence of his counsel's ineffectiveness.
A defendant making a motion for post-conviction relief based
on ineffective assistance of counsel must first demonstrate that direct appellate-court review of his claim was unavailable. 74 Direct
appellate review is unavailable when the defendant offers a general objection to the manner in which inexperienced counsel conducted the defense. 7 5 Instead, the defendant must show that a
70. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-2 (1956) (1997 Reenactment). Generally, a
motion for post-conviction relief contains no time limit for filing. The Attorney
General, after receiving notice that the application was docketed, must answer
within twenty days. See id. § 10-9.1-6.
71. See id. § 10-9.1-7; see also Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Procedure § 576, at 882 (13th ed. 1992) (describing the post-conviction relief procedure).
72. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-7; see also Torcia, supra note 71 (discussing
the process of appeal after a post-conviction relief proceeding).
73. In a post-conviction relief proceeding, "both sides have a right to discovery
with the permission of the court." R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-7; see also State's Memorandum Responding to the Decision Granting Motion for a New Trial at 3, State
v. Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 1997) (No. 96-1005A) ("[Llitigation regarding competence of counsel is more complicated and time consuming than the trial of the
substantive crime ....
For this complex litigation, it is clear that under Rhode
Island procedure, the vehicle for raising and litigating the issue is an application
by the defendant for post-conviction relief."). In a post-conviction relief proceeding,
the applicant may discuss out-of-court conversations he had with his attorney that
could substantiate an ineffectiveness claim. See infra p. 280-81.
74. See State v. Duggan, 414 A.2d 788, 791 (R.I. 1980); R.I. Gen. Laws § 109.1-1(b) (1956) (1997 Reenactment) ("This remedy is not a substitute for.., direct
review of the sentence or conviction.").
75. See id.; State v. Roderick, 403 A.2d 1090, 1092 (R.I. 1979).
[Tihese alleged judicial transgressions [the assignments of error made by
defendant on appeal] were not met with an objection. The failure to make
such a contemporaneous objection, as mandated by Super. R. Crim. P. 51,
generally precludes claiming error for the first time in this court ....
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specific trial-court ruling deprived him of a fair trial 7 6 The principle behind post-conviction relief is to provide the appellate court
with a precise record for review by affording the trial judge an opportunity to rule on the specific issue.7 7 If a fully-developed record
and a specific trial-court ruling on the issue already exists, then
7S
there is no need for a post-conviction relief proceeding.
III. A DuwNv DEAL?:

TEXTUALIST AND POLICY-BASED COUNTER-

ARGUMENTS

A.

A Textualist Approach to Rule 33: Grantinga New Trial
"On Motion of the Defendant'
Rule 33 states that the court on motion of the defendant may

grant a new trial to the defendant if the interest of justice so re-

quires.7 9 Additionally, Rhode Island Superior Court Rule 47, pertaining to motions in general, provides that a motion "shall state
with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and shall set

forth the relief or order sought."80 Therefore, a motion of the deReview may be had notwithstanding a failure to comply with these procedural rules, however, when the conduct complained of rises to substantial
constitutional dimensions, and the failure to comply with these procedural requirements is not an intentional tactical bypass ....Rather than
draw our attention to any specific ruling by the trial court, defendant asserts that counsel's general conduct of the case rises to the level of incompetency. Without diminishing the importance of this sixth amendment
challenge, we adhere to our prior practice of not reviewing such claims
unless they are founded upon specific trial court rulings. Our ruling today, however, has no effect on defendant' s right to raise this issue in the
more appropriate form of a post-conviction proceeding.
Id.; see also Duggan, 414 A.2d at 791 ("[The trial record must indicate clearly that
the defendant did not deliberately bypass the issue at trial. The record must reveal also that the alleged deprivation of basic constitutional rights would not constitute harmless error.").
76. See State v. Levitt, 371 A.2d 596, 600 (R.I. 1977).
77. See generally Sunseri v. State 656 A.2d 619 (R.I. 1995) (describing how the
defendant first made a motion for a new trial and, after it was denied, then made a
petition for post-conviction relief on the grounds that his attorney was ineffective).
78. See State v. Caruolo, 524 A.2d 575, 585 (R.I 1987) ("In light of this standard for review it is crucial for the trial justice to articulate the facts upon which
the ruling is based.").
79. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33.
80. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 47. Rule 47 provides that:
An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A motion
other than one made during trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the
court permits it to be made orally. It shall state with particularity the
grounds upon which it is made and shall set forth the relief or order
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fendant, stating the particulargrounds relied on, is a condition
precedent to a court's granting a new-trial motion. 8 ' Even if in the
best interests of the defendant, the right to move for a new trial is
not for the trial judge to usurp; the right is reserved for the defend82
ant only.
sought. It may be supported by affidavit. The requirement of writing is
fulfilled if the motion is stated in a written notice of the hearing of the
motion.
Id.
See R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33 reporter's notes ("The requirement of G.L.
1956 (1969 Reenactment), § 9-23-1 [repealed] (Supp. 1970) that the motion 'state
the grounds relied upon' is covered by the requirement of Rule 47 that motions,
other than those made during trial, be in writing and state the grounds upon
which they are made.") (alteration in original). Since Judge Fortunate supplied his
own particular grounds for the motion that displaced those of the defendant, the
motion did not comply with Rule 47 and therefore ceased to be the defendant's as
required by Rule 33. Rule 47 makes clear that when one makes an application to
the court via a motion, at that time the motion must state the grounds with particularity. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 47. Cf. Defendant's Motion for a New Trial,
State v. Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. June 30, 1997) (No. 96-1005A) (stating Dunn's particular ground supporting his motion for a new trial).
81. See R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. Form 30. Motion for a New Trial (Rule 33).
The form provides that:
The defendant moves the court to grant him a new trial for the following
reasons:
1. The verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.
2. The defendant was substantially prejudiced and deprived of a fair trial
by reason of the following circumstances: On _,
19,....
3. Since the completion of the trial defendant has discovered new evidence
of which he was ignorant at the time of the trial and which in the exercise
of due diligence he could not have discovered sooner. The evidence is material, is not cumulative, and is of such character that if received at the
trial it would probably have resulted in a different verdict.
Id.; see also State v. Scurry, 636 A.2d 719, 724 (R.I. 1994) (discussing the defendant's particular grounds for a new trial). The court in Scurry stated that the defendant's first motion for a new trial cited as grounds (1) newly-discovered
evidence and (2) the interest of justice because of a prosecutorial misrepresentation which adversely affected the defense. The court granted the motion, focusing
on the particular ground raised by the defendant, i.e., the prosecutorial misrepresentation. Id.; see also State v. Diaz, 654 A.2d 1195, 1200 (R.I. 1995) (showing that
the defendant, in the interest of justice, based her new-trial motion on insufficient
evidence); State v. Cardoza, 649 A.2d 745, 749 (R.I. 1994) (stating that the defendant raised a motion for a new trial, in the interest of justice, because the verdict
was against the weight of the evidence).
82. See R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33; see also infra note 86 (reasoning that a
judge who grants a defendant's new-trial motion on his own grounds exceeds his
jurisdiction because he is, in effect, making his own motion).
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United States v. Braman83 illustrates this premise. The defendant in Braman moved for a new trial in the interest of justice

and provided several supporting grounds. Similar to Dunn, the
trial judge in Braman granted a motion for a new trial in the interest of justice but not on the particular interest of justice grounds
asserted in the defendant's motion.8 4 Rather, he granted the motion sua sponte on the ground of prejudicial joinder of defendants. 85 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated that,
since the defendant's motion for a new trial did not raise the
ground of prejudicial joinder, the trial court's action exceeded its
jurisdiction.8 6 Thus, the appellate court held that, when a trial
83. 327 A.2d 530 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
84. The defendant's motion read:
1. The verdict returned in this cause rested only upon conjecture and speculation, the government failing to negate reasonable inferences consistent
with innocence with respect to defendants' flight.
2. The jury gave impermissive weight to identification testimony... the
court having previously ruled at the conclusion of the identification hearings and this cause that it had serious question with respect to the independent source for [the witness'] identification of defendant ....
3. The jury should not have been permitted to conjecture merely or to conclude upon pure speculation or from passion, prejudice or sympathy.
4. The in court and in the presence of the jury outburst of [a witness]
created such an aura of bias, prejudice, sensationalism and passion such
as to render impossible for the defendant to be afforded a fair and impartial trial.
5. And for such other reasons as may be pointed out in the argument,
points and authorities attached hereto and further oral argument to be
heard on this motion.
Id. at 531. The motion did not mention a newly-discovered evidence ground. Since
the only two grounds for a new trial are newly-discovered evidence and the interest
of justice, the ground relied on by the defendant was in the interest of justice.
See also Torcia, supra note 71, § 633.02[2] (discussing the wide variety of
grounds which fall under the rubric of "interest ofjustice"). See generally State v.
Gauldin, 737 S.W.2d 795, 798 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) (stating that a motion must
state its grounds with particularity). "When... the issue [that the jury instructions were unclear and confusing] does not advise the trial court or opposing counsel of the basis of the error or irregularity, the issue should not have been
considered by the trial court on the motion for a new trial...." Id. The defendant
in Gauldin did not raise his motion for a new trial on the newly-discovered evidence ground. Thus, the defendant raised the interest of justice ground. If the
ground raised in Gauldin was not sufficient to satisfy the Rule 47 particularity
requirement, then neither is a general interest of justice ground.
85. See Braman, 327 A.2d at 535.
86. See id. ("[Tihe ruling of the trial court granting the motion for a new trial
on grounds not asserted in defendant's motion but articulated sua sponte by the
trial court, is action by the court 'on its own motion,' and, being beyond the jurisdiction of the court, is ineffective.'") (citing United States v. Newman, 456 F.2d
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judge grants a motion for a new trial on grounds not presented in
the defendant's original motion, the judge is, in effect, making his
own motion. Such action, the court reasoned, is plainly forbidden

by the language of Rule

33.87

A trial judge must exercise his authority within the linguistic
boundaries of the rule. ss In the interest of justice, Vealey motioned the court for a new trial on the particular ground that the
evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. However, Judge
Fortunato granted the motion on the grounds of newly-discovered
evidence and, in the interest of justice, ineffective assistance of
counsel,8 9 Thus, in Dunn, the defendant did not present, in accordance with Rule 33 and Rule 47, a motion for a new trial which became the basis for Judge Fortunato's ultimate decision. 90
Although based on the interest of justice ground, Dunn's motion
provided a particular ground-the verdict was against the weight
of the evidence. Judge Fortunato relied on a different particular
ground-ineffective assistance of counsel-when ordering a new
trial in the interest of justice. The motion did not comply with
Rule 47; therefore, Judge Fortunato could not grant Dunn's motion
for a new trial on his own grounds because to do so would, in effect,
mean that he was granting a new trial on his own motion. Such an
action is plainly forbidden by Rules 33 and 47.91
668, 672 (3rd Cir. 1972)); see also United States v. Saban-Gutierrez, 783 F. Supp.
1538, 1547 (D.P.R. 1991) (citing the above language from Braman and Newman).
87. See Braman, 327 A.2d at 535. Except for the language excluding new trials for errors of law, the language of Rule 33 governing Braman is identical to
Rhode Island Rule 33. Compare D.C. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33 with R.I. Super. Ct.
R. Crim. P. 33.
88. See State v. Tooher, 542 A.2d 1084, 1087 (R.I. 1988) ("A newly-discovered
evidence claim must be presented to the trial justice in accordance with Rule 33 of
the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.").
89. See supra section 1.B.
90. Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure 47 states that
lain application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A motion... shall
state with particularity the grounds upon which it is made." Id.
91. See id. See generally Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 791-92 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
[I]f an accused has not had a trial, and a fair one in the jurisprudential
sense of that word, the courts will supply a remedy. We do so upon occasion. But it is an extraordinary remedy. Courts ought not-must notforget that our vaunted rule of law is a structure of rules; it is not an
amorphous jelly of judicial pleasure. The rule of law is government by
rules properly adopted. The precise opposite of that prized system is a
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In Dunn, one could argue that Judge Fortunato did not order a
new trial on his own motion. Rather, the argument follows, he
granted the defendant's motion for a new trial but merely supplied
his own grounds. This argument fails however. When a judge
grants a defendant's motion for a new trial but inserts his own
grounds and negates those provided by the92defendant, the judge is
ordering the new trial on his own motion.
It is worth noting that Rhode Island Rule 29, which pertains to
motions for acquittal, expressly includes language that gives the
trial judge power to grant a motion for acquittal on his own motion:
"[tihe court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall
order the entry of judgment of acquittal."93 The reporter's notes
accompanying Rule 29 expressly refer to the drafters' intention to
grant the trial judge such sua sponte power: "[Rule 29(a)] expressly
authorizes the trial court to grant judgment of acquittal on its own
motion. Moreover, no authorities in Rhode Island either recognize
or deny a trial judge's right to act sua sponte."94 When the members of the superior court amended Rule 33 in 1983, it stands to
reason that they would have taken similar steps with respect to
new-trial motions if they intended to include a similar grant of
power. It is indeed unreasonably baffling to assume that the superior court would make the same grant of sua sponte power specifically clear in one rule-Rule 29-and hopelessly ambiguous in the
other-Rule 33.
B. Statutory Constructs
1. Section 8-6-2 Constrains Rule 33 Sua Sponte Power
Section 8-6-2 of the Rhode Island General Laws grants a majority of superior court judges the power to promulgate court
rules. 95 A single superior court judge, however, does not possess
this concomitant power. Thus, Judge Fortunato's modification/inpractice of disposing of each case without regard to rules and according to
the individual and perhaps ephemeral pleasure--or opinion-of a judge.

Id.
92. See supra note 86.

93. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 29 (amended 1975) (emphasis added).
94. Id. reporter's notes,
95. R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-6-2 Note 1 (1956) (1997 Reenactment) (stating that
"[tihe evident intent of the legislature was to confer upon the courts power to facilitate progress in the conduct of litigation by the making and promulgating of rules
for regulating practice").
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terpretation of Rule 33, a court rule which should be treated with
the deference of a statute, 96 contradicts section 8-6-2. When court
rules' plain meanings are clear, a judge cannot unilaterally over97
ride the court rules to achieve a just result in a particular case.
Rather, altering the rules requires observance of the proper statutory channels. The legislature has provided such proper statutory
channels which sufficiently protect a defendant's right to a fair
trial. 98 Only a majority of the superior court may agree to enlarge
Rule 33 to include the power to grant a new trial according to
Judge Fortunato's reasoning. 99 Thus far, a majority of the superior court has not done so. Until that time, the boundaries imposed
by section 8-6-2 limit judicial powers.
2. Post-Conviction Relief as the More Appropriate Vehicle
A motion for post-conviction relief is a more appropriate vehicle for an ineffectiveness claim because the intent of post-conviction relief is to govern alleged violations of substantive rights, e.g.,
the right to have effective assistance of counsel. 10 0 By contrast,
the drafters created Rule 33, and the accompanying superior court
rules, to govern procedural issues only. 10 1 Rule 33 unambiguously
provides the procedure for a new-trial motion in a bench trial: "the
96. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-6-2 Note 2 (citing Letendre v. Rhode Island Hosp.
Trust Co., 60 A.2d 471(1948)).
97. See State v. Duggan, 414 A.2d 788, 791 (R.I. 1980) ("Legislative intent
controls judicial interpretation when it is ascertainable and within legislative competence."); accord R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-6-2 (providing that "[tihe rules presently in
effect in the courts of the judicial system shall remain and continue in force and
effect until revised, amended, repealed, or superseded by rules adopted in accordance with this section") (emphasis added); see also State v. Pacheco, 481 A.2d 1009,
1018 (R.I. 1984) (noting that, "as in statutory construction, if a court rule is free of
ambiguity and expresses a clear and definite meaning, there is no room for interpretation or extension, and the court must give to the words of the rule their plain
and obvious meaning").
98. See R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 8-6-2; 10-9.1-1 (governing defendants' petitions for
post-conviction relief for alleged violations of constitutional rights).
99. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-6-2.
100. See State v. Gatone, 698 A.2d 230, 242 (R.I. 1997); State v. Malstrom, 672
A.2d 448, 450 (R.I. 1996) (quoting State v. Heath, 665 A.2d 1336, 1337-38 (R.I.
1995)) ("This court has held, however, that it will not consider ineffective-assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal. Such issues are considered only in an
application for post-conviction relief."); Dyer v. Keefe, 198 A.2d 159, 161-62 (R.I.
1964) ("[Tlhe rulemaking power ... conferred upon the court must be confined to
regulating the pleading, practice and procedure therein. It cannot be extended to
categories not reasonably comprehended by those terms.").
101. See R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 1.
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court on motion of a defendant for a new trial may vacate the judgment if entered, take additional testimony and direct entry of a
new judgment."10 2 In his attempt to fashion Rule 33 into a vehicle
for addressing alleged constitutional violations, Judge Fortunato
inadvertently exposed the rule's inadequacy for an ineffectiveness
claim.
Judge Fortunato, sitting without a jury, did vacate his judgment and took some additional, yet limited, testimony which he
placed on the record for possible supreme-court review.10 3 Rule 33
mandates, however, that the trial judge must admit additional testimony, vacate the judgment and direct entry of a new judgment.
Judge Fortunato did not direct entry of a new judgment in
Dunn.10 4 In response to this argument, Judge Fortunato stated
that he saw little point in reopening and continuing the trial after
05
he had determined that Vealey had thus far been ineffective.'
Most notably, Judge Fortunato stated that the waiver of Dunn's
right to a jury trial could not be "redone."10 6 As a result, instead of
directing a new judgment, Judge Fortunate ordered a new trial, an
option not contained in Rule 33's procedure for bench trials.
Therefore, Judge Fortunato unnecessarily and improperly redefined Rule 33 to supplant a motion for post-conviction relief.
While the procedure for a new-trial motion is found in a court
rule and a motion for post-conviction relief is statutory, a properlypromulgated court rule has the same force and effect of a statute. 0 7 If the remedies provided for within Rule 33 prove inadequate, then the defendant can obtain a remedy for constitutional

102. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33.
103. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 7, 15 app. at 320, 324,
State v. Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 1997) (No. 96-1005A).
104. See id. at 31 app. at 332 (stating that "the context of this case makes that
solution to the problem [entry of a new judgment] not an apt one, if the goal, as
[Judge Fortunato] said, is and must be, the conduct of a fair trial that reaches a
just result").
105. See Interview with Judge Steven J. Fortunato, Jr., Rhode Island Superior
Court Justice, in Providence, R.I. (Oct. 31, 1997).
106. Id.
107. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-6-2 Note 2 (1956) (1997 Reenactment) ("A rule of
court, if promulgated under the proper exercise of judicial power to make rules of
practice and procedure within that court, is given the same force and effect as a
statute.").
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violations via post-conviction relief.10 8 If a particular rule does not
provide an effective procedure to insure a trial's just result, then a
trial judge should employ the proper vehicle for reforming the rule
provided by the state legislature. That vehicle is section 8-6-2 of
the Rhode Island General Laws, stating that the superior court has
the power to promulgate court rules by a majority of its members. 10 9 Such court rules will remain in effect until they are reformed, which again requires a majority of the superior court. 110
A motion for a new trial on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel is appropriate if based on specific rulings of the
trial judge resulting in a fully-developed record ready for supremecourt review."' Judge Fortunato believed that his specific findings concerning Vealey's performance created a fully-developed
108. See generally State v. Heath, 665 A.2d 1336, 1337-38 (R.I. 1995) ("This
court... will not consider ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal.

Such issues are considered only in an application for post-conviction relief.").
109. R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-6-2. Section 8-6-2 sets out the procedure for promulgating court rules:
The superior court .

.

. by a majority of their members, shall have the

power to make rules for regulating practice, procedure and business
therein. The rules of the superior... court shall be subject to the approval of the supreme court. Such rules, when effective, shall supersede
any statutory regulation in conflict therewith .... In prescribing such
rules, the court shall have regard to the simplification of the system of
pleading, practice and procedure in the courts in which the rules shall
apply in order to promote the speedy determination of litigation on the
merits;... The rules presently in effect in the courts of the judicial system
shall remain and continue in force and effect until revised, amended, repealed, or superseded by rules adopted in accordance with this section.
Id. (emphasis added).
110. See id.
111. See State v. Lussier, 686 A.2d 79, 81 (R.I. 1996); see also State v. Farlett,
490 A.2d 52, 54 (R.I. 1985) (requiring a fully-developed record for appellate court
review).
[T]he appropriate vehicle for review of claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel is the request for post-conviction relief. Our reluctance to entertain such claims is based on the rooted principle that "only specific rulings
of a trial justice are reviewable on direct appeal." Unless a defendant
complies with the procedure for post conviction relief, we shall not have
the benefit of a full record and a decision of the Superior Court regarding
whether or not defense counsel's alleged failings were a deliberate bypass
of the required procedure or a genuine manifestation of ineffective assistance of counsel."
Id. In Dunn, Judge Fortunato did not create a full record upon which to base his
opinion because Vealey was unable to develop fully his defenses.
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record for review on appeal.'1 2 Though Judge Fortunato made
specific findings concerning defense counsel's effectiveness, he developed merely a one-sided record" i 3 which does not support his
i 4
opinion."

112. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 26 app. at 329-30, State v.
Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 1997) (No. 96-1005A); see also Lussier, 686 A.2d at 81
(discussing the appellate court's need for a fully-developed record when reviewing
lower court decisions); State v. Vanasse, 593 A.2d 58, 67-68 (R.I. 1991) ("If the trial
justice has sufficiently articulated the rationale for whatever decision he or she has
rendered, then such ruling is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed by
this court unless the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence or
was otherwise clearly wrong.").
113. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-7 (1956) (1997 Reenactment) (discussing the
myriad of potential procedural alternatives including proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony and ordering the applicant to appear before the court); id.
§ 10-9.1-3 (1956) (1997 Reenactment) (stating that a party may file an application
for post-conviction relief at any time). Judge Fortunato's two in-chambers conferences did not substitute for the rights provided to the prosecution, the defendant
and the accused attorney by post-conviction hearing because they lacked the section 10-9.1-7 procedural safeguards. But see Commonwealth v. Kozerski, 294
N.E.2d 460, 463 & n. 4 (Mass. 1973) (noting that, unlike in Dunn, the defendant
made a motion for a new trial on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel). In
Kozerski, two hearings were held on the motion for a new trial and the defendant
elicited evidence supporting his claim. The trial judge denied the motion. The
appellate court was apparently satisfied that the record was fully developed. It
heard the appeal and ruled that the evidence elicited at these hearings fully supported the trial judge's determination on the issue presented in the defendant's
motion for a new trial.
114. See infra section IV.B. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court will
not disturb the determinations of the trial judge unless he or she has overlooked or
misconceived relevant and material evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong. See
R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-6-2; State v. Scurry, 636 A.2d 719, 725 (R.I. 1994); State v.
Caruolo, 524 A.2d 575, 585 (R.I. 1987).
In reviewing a denial of a new-trial motion, [the Supreme Court] will not
disturb a trial justice's ruling unless the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence relating to a critical issue or was otherwise
clearly wrong. In light of this standard for review it is crucial for the trial
justice to articulate the facts upon which the ruling is based.
Id. See generally In re Paul, 626 A.2d 694, 695 (R.I. 1993) (noting that "a] trial
justice's decision in a non-jury ... criminal trial... is entitled to great weight and
will not be disturbed by this court, unless it is incorrect as a matter of law or is
otherwise clearly wrong"); Fontaine v. State, 602 A.2d 521, 524 (R.I. 1992) (holding
that "[tihe findings and decisions of a trial justice should not be disturbed unless it
is clearly shown that such an exercise of his or her discretion is improper or an
abuse").
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C.

Policy Arguments Against Rule 33 Sua Sponte Power

Judge Fortunato makes myriad policy arguments to support
his actions in Dunn. However, such policy-based justifications do
not necessitate the sweeping changes Judge Fortunato made to
Rule 33 procedure. Also, policy arguments exist that warn against
such judicial action.
1.

Double Jeopardy

a. United States v. Smith, Double Jeopardy and Their Effect on
Rule 33
The United States Constitution, as well as the Rhode Island
Constitution, prevents the government from prosecuting defendants twice for the same crime. 115 The Supreme Court addressed
the dangers associated with violating this right in United States v.
Smith. 1 16 In Smith, the Court stated that judgments would never
truly be considered final if judges could reserve power to grant a
defendant a new trial after the case had been appealed to and decided by an appellate court. 11 7 In Smith, the Supreme Court ruled
that a judge could not grant a new trial on his own motion beyond
the time limit placed upon a defendant's motion:
(I]t would be a strange rule which deprived a judge of power
to do what was asked when request was made by the person
most concerned, and yet allowed him to act without petition.
If a condition of the power is that request for its exercise not
be made, serious constitutional issues would be raised. For it
is such request which obviates any later objection the defendant might make on the ground of double-jeopardy. 1 18
115. U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 2 ("[Nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; .. ."); R.I. Const. art. 1, § 7 ("No
person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy.").

116. 331 U.S. 469 (1947).
117. See id. at 474-75 (stating that "[q]uestions of finality would be raised if the
trial court, while formally denying the motion for new trial on the record, reserves
the right to change its mind after the opinion of an appellate court has been elicited .... [and] to approve the practice.. .would almost certainly subject trial judges
to private appeals or application by counsel or friends of one convicted"); see also 26
James Win. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 633.22[1] (3d ed. 1997) (discussing the need for finality as justification for removing a judge's sua sponte
power to grant new trials).
118. Smith, 331 U.S. at 474.
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The holding in Smith denied judges the power to grant a motion for a new trial sua sponte if the time in which a defendant
could file a similar motion had passed. 1 19 In response to the Smith
Court's concerns regarding the problem of timeliness and its effect
on double jeopardy, the drafters of the federal rules amended Federal Rule 33 in 1966 to deny explicitly a trial judge's power to grant
a new trial on his own motion at any time.1 20 The rule, as
amended, now protects the defendant from possible double-jeopardy problems arising from a new trial that he or she did not
request.
b.

The Relationship Between Federal and Rhode Island Rule 33

Although some jurisdictions grant a trial judge the power to
order a new trial on his own motion,' 2 ' other jurisdictions forbid
122
such an action precisely because of the risk of double jeopardy.
Federal Rule 33 does not allow a judge to grant a new trial on his
own motion because of the concerns regarding timeliness and
double jeopardy. 123 The Rhode Island Supreme Court has looked
to the federal rules and related case law to interpret the Rhode
Island rules.' 24 Therefore, one may reason by analogy that the
"timeliness" policy behind the federal rule's double-jeopardy restriction on a judge's sua sponte power exists as well in Rhode Is12 5
land Superior Court.
119. Id. at 475 ("We think that expiration of the time within which relief can
openly be asked of the judge, terminates the time within which it can properly be
granted on the court's own initiative.").
120. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 advisory committee's notes.
121. For example, the state judicial branches in Arizona, Alabama, Florida,
New Mexico, Tennessee and Utah have promulgated rules regarding motions for a
new trial that expressly grant the trial justice the power to order a new trial sua
sponte. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.1; Ala. R. Crim. P. 24.1; Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.580;
N.M. R. Crim. P. 5-614; Tenn. R. Crim. P. 33; Utah R. Crim. P. 24.
122. See, e.g., Powell v. District Court of Seventh Judicial Dist., 473 P.2d 254
(Okla. Crim. 1970) (construing 22 Okla. Stat. § 952 (1961) to deny judges sua
sponte power to grant new trials); Zaragosta v. State, 588 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Crim.
1979) (construing V.A.C.C.P. 40.02 to deny sua sponte power); Vt. R. Crim. P. 33.
123. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 advisory committee's notes ("The amendments to the
first two sentences make it clear that a judge has no power to order a new trial on
his own motion, that he can act only in response to a motion timely made by a
defendant. Problems of double jeopardy arise when the court acts of its own
motion.").
124. See infra notes 138-39.
125. Rhode Island's Rule 33 is principally the same as its federal counterpart
with two major exceptions. Since neither of those two exceptions pertain to sua
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At this point, a brief textual analysis of Federal Rule 33 is appropriate. Federal Rule 33 provides that:
The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to
that defendant if required in the interest of justice. If trial
was by the court without a jury the court on motion of a defendant for a new trial may vacate the judgment if entered,
take additional testimony and direct the entry of a new judgment. A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newlydiscovered evidence may be made only before or within two
years after final judgment, but if an appeal is pending the
court may grant the motion only on remand of the case. A
motion for a new trial based on any other grounds shall be
made within 7 days after verdict or finding of guilty or within
time as the court may fix during the 7-day
such further
26
period.1
The first sentence of the federal rule is identical to that of the
Rhode Island rule: "[tihe court on motion of a defendant may grant
a new trial to that defendant if required in the interest of justice." 127

The remainder of the two rules is principally the same

with two exceptions. 128 First, in Rhode Island, a judge may not
grant a motion for a new trial for errors of law which occurred at
trial. 12 9 Second, in Rhode Island, a defendant has a greater period
of time-up to two years after the court enters judgment-to file a
motion on the grounds of newly-discovered evidence. 130 Neither
exception is relevant to the federal rule's ban on sua sponte newtrial motions because of the possible double-jeopardy
implications.

13 1

One could hypothesize that Federal Rule 33 is permissive because it provides that the court may grant a new trial. Thus, the
argument follows, the drafters of the federal rules must have intended to allow judges to grant new trials without a defendant's
sponte prohibition, it stands to reason that the prohibition survived along with the
other similarities to Federal Rule 33. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33 reporter's
notes; see also State's Memorandum Responding to the Decision Granting Motion
for a New Trial at 4, State v. Dunn, (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 6th, 1997) (No. 96-1005A)
(comparing Rhode Island Rule 33 with its federal counterpart).
126. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33.
127. Compare Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 (emphasis added) with R.I. Super. Ct. R.
Crim. P. 33.
128. See R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33 reporter's notes.
129. See R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33.
130. See id.
131. See supra section III.A.
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motion. 1 32 However, this hypothesis permits a possible doublejeopardy situation-a judge with sua sponte power could subject a
defendant to another trial at any time. 13 3 Such a double-jeopardy
situation is exactly what the drafters attempted to avoid by allowing trial judges to grant new trials only upon the timely-made
3
motions of defendants.' '
The 1966 amendment to Federal Rule 33 clarified this intent
and obviated the Smith Court's fears by denying a trial judge the
power to grant a motion for a new trial sua sponte: "[The court] can
act only in response to a motion timely made by a defendant.
Problems of double jeopardy arise when the court acts on its own
motion." 1385 Smith provides a clue to the drafters' intent underpinning the 1966 amendment to Federal Rule 33: "It is not necessary
for us now to decide whether... retrial on the court's own motion
would amount to double-jeopardy. That a serious constitutional issue would be presented by such a procedure is enough to suggest
that we avoid a construction that will raise such an issue." 13 6 The
amendment, denying outright a judge's ability to grant a new trial
on his own motion, is a procedural safeguard to avoid even the
37
mere possibility of a constitutional violation.'
132. See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 431 (1996).
133. See United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 472 (1947).
134. See id.
135. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 (1966 Amendment) (The pre-1966 version of the rule
stated in pertinent part that "[t]he court may grant a new trial to a defendant if
required in the interest of justice"); see also Smith, 331 U.S. at 472 (discussing the
potential double jeopardy dangers resulting if judges could grant new trials sua
sponte beyond the time limit allowed for a defendant to file a similar motion).
136. Smith, 331 U.S. at 474-75. See generally United States v. Saban-Gutierrez, 783 F. Supp. 1538, 1548 (D.P.R. 1991) ("[Ihe reality that sua sponte action by
this court may create a double-jeopardy issue causes us concern.") (emphasis
added).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Braman, 327 A.2d 530, 534 (D.C. 1974).
[Tihe amendment to Federal Rule 33 in 1966 not only extended the time
limitation from five to seven days but specifically provided that a new trial
may be granted only "on motion of a defendant." The purpose of the
amendment, according to a note of the Advisory Committee of the Judicial
Conference of the U.S., is to "make clear that a judge has no power to
order a new trial on his own motion, that he can only act in response to a
motion timely made by a defendant."
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. Rule 33 Supp. 1961-70, Notes of Advisory Committee on
Rules). The drafters of the federal rules viewed this safeguard as necessary in
view of the serious constitutional issue being raised.
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The Rhode Island rule, like its federal counterpart, does not
provide for a case-by-case analysis to determine whether, in specific instances, concerns of double jeopardy will in fact arise. Until
a superior-court majority votes to amend it, the Rhode Island rule
must stand in its current form as a general safeguard which does
not allow for a case-by-case analysis of possible double-jeopardy
claims. Since the Rhode Island rule is principally the same as the
federal rule, one may analogize the two rules, as the Rhode Island
Supreme Court generally has done. 138 Accordingly, in light of the
past practice of using the federal rules and precedent to interpret
the Rhode Island rules, the Rhode Island rule should also deny a
judge the power to order a new trial on his own motion. 139
c. Double Jeopardy and Dunn
In Dunn, one could argue that the defendant waived his right
to raise subsequently the constitutional ground of being tried twice
140
for the same offense when he filed a motion for a new trial.
However, the new-trial motion still became the judge's own motion
and not that of the defendant. 14 1 Therefore, the defendant did not
138. See Nocera v. Lembo, 298 A.2d 800, 803 (R.I. 1973) ("In construing the
Superior Court rules it has been our practice to look for guidance in the precedents
of the federal courts, upon whose rules those of the Superior court are closely patterned."); see also State v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528, 532 (R.I. 1992) (using federal jurisprudence regarding the Federal Rules of Evidence to interpret the corresponding
Rhode Island Rules of Evidence); State v. LaChappelle, 424 A.2d 1039, 1045 n.5
(R.I. 1981) (looking to federal authorities for guidance in interpreting a superior
court rule of criminal procedure); State v. Grover, 314 A.2d 138, 140 (R.I. 1974)
(stating that, if the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure were
clearly lifted from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, then one may use the
federal rule interpretation to analyze the state rule).
139. See State v. Heath, 665 A.2d 1336, 1337 (R.I. 1995) (emphasizing the similarity between Federal and Rhode Island Rule 33). See generally State's Memorandum Responding to the Decision Granting Motion for a New Trial at 4, State v.
Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 1997) (No. 96-1005A) (comparing Rhode Island Rule
33 with its federal counterpart); State's Memorandum in Support of Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 31, State v. Dunn (No. 97-414 M.P.) ("The federal rule of criminal procedure governing motions for a new trial, upon which the Rhode Island
Rule is based, is essentially the same . .

").

140. See Saban-Gutierrez,783 F. Supp. at 1548 ("Literally, all that is lacking is
a formal motion made by the defendant. On the other hand, the plain language of
Rule 33, the Advisory Committee note, other circuits' case law, all point toward the
need for strict compliance with the mandates of Rule 33. The reality is that sua
sponte action by this court may create a double-jeopardy issue causes us
concern.").
141. See supra note 86.
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waive his double-jeopardy protection by moving for a new trial.
There exists the danger that if a judge retains the power to grant
new trials sua sponte, then defendants may be placed at risk of
double jeopardy. Such action is unconstitutional under either the
state or federal Constitution. 1 4 2 Even though Dunn requested a
new trial, nothing in Rhode Island's Rule 33 suggests a case-bycase inquiry that avoids the federal ban on sua sponte motions.
Granting Judge Fortunato the power to grant a new trial on his
own motion would be tantamount to creating a sua sponte power
which "lingers on indefinitely." 14 3 This dangerous and ill-defined
procedure is exactly what the Smith Court was trying to avoid.
The policy concerns regarding timeliness apply to Judge Fortunato's ability to grant a new trial on his own motion. Rhode Island Rule 33 adopted the time limitation imposed by the federal
rule for motions based on newly-discovered evidence-two yearsand expanded the time limit for motions based on all other
grounds, except errors of law, from seven to ten days.'" Thus, the
timeliness concern does not affect a new-trial motion on grounds of
newly-discovered evidence because Judge Fortunato's motion on
such grounds was brought well within the two-year time limit. But
a party must bring a motion on interest of justice grounds within
ten days after entry of the verdict.145 Judge Fortunato rendered a
verdict in Dunn on June 24th, and then overturned that verdict
and granted a new trial on his own grounds on August 6th, fortythree days later. His action, therefore, did not fall within the prescribed time limit of ten days to grant a motion for new trial on
interest of justice grounds. Such a belated action by a trial judge
invokes the policy dangers discussed in Smith. 46 The more correct procedure would be to request that Dunn move for a new trial
142. See generally 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law §263 (1981) ("[An order of the
trial court granting a new trial in a criminal case upon its own motion places the
defendant in double jeopardy where the court lacks the power to enter such an
order or improperly exercises its power.").
143. United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1947).
144. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 33.
145. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33; State v. Heath, 665 A.2d 1336, 1337 (R.I.
1995). See generally United States v. Garcia, 19 F.3d 1123, 1126 (6th Cir. 1994)
(stating that "the only ground [for a new trial] entertained after seven days is that
of newly-discovered evidence").
146. E.g., Smith, 331 U.S. at 473-74 (discussing how a judge's power to grant
new trials sua sponte would destroy the finality of verdicts because such power
"lingers on indefinitely").
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on the grounds cited by Judge Fortunato. 147 To do so would ensure
that the motion remains timely and obviate potential double-jeopardy problems. 148 And if the time limit has run, then the option of
14 9
a post-conviction relief motion still remains.
Consequently, Judge Fortunato did not have the power to
grant a new trial in the interest of justice on the grounds that defense counsel was ineffective. 150 The ten-day time limit may be
extended "within such further time as the court may fix during the
ten-day period."1 5 1 Even though he supplied the new grounds,
Judge Fortunato did not state that he had extended the time frame
for making the motion in his August 6th decision to grant a new
trial. If the time has run, then a claim based on the interest of
justice 2must be brought as an application for post-conviction
relief.15
2.

Dunn, the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Start of a
Slippery Slope

Defense counsel Vealey could not defend Judge Fortunato's ineffectiveness claim during the two in-chambers colloquies because
many of his answers would have violated the attorney-client privilege: "[tihe general rule is that communications made by a client to
his attorney for the purpose of seeking professional advice, as well
as the responses by the attorney to such inquiries, are privileged
communications not subject to disclosure." 15 3 For an attorney to
147. See United States v. Saban-Gutierrez, 783 F. Supp. 1538, 1549 (D.P.R.
1991) (recognizing the court's ability to request that the defendant move for a new
trial if he so desires).
148. See id.
149. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-1 (1956) (1997 Reenactment) (setting forth the
procedure for post-conviction relief); id. § 10-9.1-3 (stating that a motion for postconviction relief may be filed at any time).
150. See, e.g., State v. Heath, 665 A.2d 1336, 1337 (R.I. 1995) ("Rule 33 of the
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure is similar to its federal counterpart.
Time limitations under the federal rules are jurisdictional, and federal courts have
held that they lack the authority to entertain a motion for new trial beyond the
time limitations set forth in the rule.").
151. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33 (emphasis added).
152. State v. Bishop, 439 A.2d 255, 263 (R.I. 1982); State v. Lanoue, 366 A.2d
1158 (R.I. 1976); see also R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 45(b) (allowing parties an
increased amount of time to do an act required by the court or the rules). Rule
45(b) explicitly excludes Rule 33 from such consideration. Id.
153. State v. Von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995, 1004 (R.I. 1984); see also Rosati v.
Kuzman, 660 A.2d 263, 265 (R.I. 1995) (discussing an attorney's responsibility to
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defend thoroughly a charge of ineffectiveness, the defendant must
waive the attorney-client privilege. 15 4 When a defendant charges
his attorney with ineffectiveness via a motion for post-conviction
relief, he waives the attorney-client privilege. 15 5 Dunn, however,
neither raised the ineffectiveness claim nor waived his attorneyclient privilege because he did not bring a motion for post-conviction relief.
Judge Fortunato referred to the delicate matter presented by
the attorney-client privilege in his August 6th opinion.' 56 He
stated that he held the colloquies in-chambers because the questions and answers came close to affecting the attorney-client privilege. 15 7 Because of the attorney-client privilege and the
subsequent need to be "extremely circumspect," Vealey was only
able to provide Judge Fortunato with "some answers." 158 In the
context of this new-trial proceeding, Vealey could not supply all of
the answers needed for a proper defense. 159

keep his client's communications confidential unless the client consents to disclosure); State v. Juarez, 570 A.2d 1118, 1119-20 (R.I. 1990) (same).
154. See In re Ethics Advisory Panel Opinion No. 92-1, 627 A.2d 317, 321 (R.I.
1993) ("The attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in
which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client.") (quoting R.I. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6
official comment); Von Bulow, 475 A.2d at 1005.
155. See, e.g., Von Bulow, 475 A.2d at 1008.
It is not necessary that actual privileged communications or documents
reflecting such communications be disclosed to effect a waiver of the privilege. "[A] disclosure of, or even merely an assertion about, the communication may effect a waiver of privilege not only as to that communication,
but also as to other communications made during the same consultation
and communications made at other times about the same subject.
Id.; see also Northup v. State, 272 A.2d 747, 751-52 (Me. 1971) (stating that when a
defendant brings a claim of ineffectiveness against his attorney, he waives the attorney-client privilege); Pruitt v. Peyton, 243 F.Supp. 907, 909 (D. Va. 1965)

(same).
156. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 15 app. at 324, Dunn (No.
96-1005A) ("It was necessary for all persons,.. to be extremely circumspect; nonetheless, some of the answers are telling, and they do not have any impact upon the
privilege.").
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. See infra note 168.
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a. The Law and the Policy Behind the Privilege
Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 501, concerning privileges, does
not modify nor supersede existing law pertaining to privileges. 160
If a defendant intends to invoke the attorney-client privilege, then
he must prove the existence of the following four factors:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become
a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made
(a) is [a] member of a bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b)
in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer;
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney
was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of
strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either i)
an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in
some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed
16 1
and (b) not waived by the client.
In addition, if a defendant's attorney reveals the confidential communications between himself and his client, then such disclosure
would void the purpose behind the privilege:
Confidential disclosures by a client to an attorney made in
order to obtain legal assistance are privileged ....

[I]f the

client knows that damaging information could more readily
be obtained from the attorney following disclosure than from
himself in the absence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain
fully informed legal advice. 16 2
b.

The Privilege and Its Impact in Dunn

Dunn was Vealey's client and their communications involved
Vealey's role as Dunn's lawyer. Thus, the first two prongs of the
attorney-client privilege test are satisfied. It goes without saying
that Vealey and Dunn had an attorney-client relationship, thus
satisfying the third prong.' 63 The fourth prong requires that the
160. R.I. R. Evid. 501 ("Nothing in these rules shall be deemed to modify or
supersede existing law relating to privilege.").
161. Rosati v. Kuzman, 660 A.2d 263, 265 (R.I. 1995) (citing State v. Von Bu-

low, 475 A.2d 995, 1004 (R.I. 1984)).
162. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
163. Since Judge Fortunato uses the issues of whether or not to put on character witnesses, whether to waive the right to a jury trial and whether to testify on
one's own behalf as bases for his ineffective-assistance claim, one may conclude
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client did not waive the privilege. Although this prong implies that
only the client may waive the privilege, an attorney may claim the
privilege on behalf of the client. 16 4 Dunn did not waive the privilege because he did not bring the ineffectiveness claim against
Vealey in his motion for a new trial. Rather, Judge Fortunato
brought the ineffectiveness claim. Since neither Judge Fortunato
nor Vealey can waive Dunn's attorney-client privilege, 16 5 Judge
Fortunato's decision, rife with potential breaches of the attorneyclient privilege, 166 countermands Rhode Island Supreme Court
precedent which shields confidential attorney-client communications from disclosure.167
If, during the new-trial colloquies, Vealey revealed the context
of his and Dunn's communications, then Dunn's interests in confi16 8
dentiality could very well have been adversely affected.
that such issues involve assistance in some legal proceeding. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial, Dunn (No. 96-1005A).
164. See R.I. R. Evid. 501 reporter's notes; Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 402 & n.8 (1976). But see Callahan v. Nystedt, 641 A.2d 58, 61 (R.I. 1994)
("Only the client has standing to assert the attorney-client privilege ....

If the

clients wished to assert the privilege, then each client should have personally
signed and submitted an affidavit declaring his or her intent."). Callahanis distinguishable because it involved a civil suit filed by a law firm against an attorney
regarding a fee arrangement. The firm wanted certain client files in the attorney's
possession. The attorney asserted the attorney-client privilege on behalf of his former clients. The court concluded that it was highly likely that disclosing the files
would not involve the clients' continuing interests. In the present case, disclosure
of conversations between Vealey and Dunn could affect Dunn's continuing interests in the pending civil suits. Vealey should be allowed to assert the privilege on
his client's behalf.
165. See supra note 161.
166. See State v. Marrapese, 583 A.2d 537, 543 (R.I. 1990) (stating that "Rhode
Island has long recognized the attorney-client privilege and has shielded from disclosure the confidential communications between a client and his or her attorney");
see, e.g., State v. Juarez, 570 A.2d 1118 (R.I. 1990) (applying the attorney-client
privilege to prevent an attorney from disclosing confidential communications between himself and his client); State v. Von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995 (R.I. 1984) (recognizing the attorney-client privilege and the client's ability to waive it); DeFusco v.
Giorgio, 440 A.2d 727 (R.I. 1982) (acknowledging the protection that the attorneyclient privilege affords to confidential communications between an attorney and
his client); Wartell v. Novogard, 137 A. 776 (R.I. 1927) (same).
167. See Marrapese,583 A.2d at 544.
168. See In re Request For Instructions From Disciplinary Counsel, 610 A.2d
115, 116-17 (R.I. 1992) (stating that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has adopted
Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct requiring "that a lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to representation of a client without the client's
consent").
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Although Vealey concluded that Dunn must obtain new counsel to
argue the motion for a new trial, 169 he remained Dunn's counsel
for the pending civil suits.' 7 0 Even if such information may be integral to Vealey's defense, Vealey cannot reveal the conversations
that he had with his client regarding Judge Fortunato's three
claims of ineffectiveness. 1 71 Vealey's answers to Judge Fortunato's
questions could negatively impact his client's interests in the civil
suits as well as the new criminal trial (if Judge Fortunato's opinion
stands). Even though Vealey is no longer Dunn's counsel for the
remainder of the criminal case, the attorney-client privilege is not
72
subject to any time limit.'

169. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984).
[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case,
viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct .... The court must... determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance.... The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined
or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions
.... In short, inquiry into counsel's conversations with the defendant may
be critical to a proper assessment of counsel's investigation decisions, just
as it may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel's other litigation
decisions.
Id.
170. The situation is quite different where the defendant alleges ineffectiveness
of counsel in a motion for post-conviction relief. See Jacques v. State, 669 A.2d
1124, 1146 (R.I. 1995) ("[The accused attorney] was called to the stand to corroborate the sworn statement he made in a signed affidavit... in response to Jacques'
allegations of ineffective counsel."). For an example of the thorough development
of a record for appellate court review provided by a post-conviction relief proceeding, see id. at 1148-49.
171. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial, State v. Dunn (R.I. Super.
Ct. Aug. 6, 1997) (No. 96-1005A) (stating that, at that time, Attorney David Martin
began representing Dunn for the remainder of the criminal trial). See generally
Gerald M. Carbone, Priest to Get New Trial-JudgeReverses His Own Decision,
Prov. J. Bull., Aug. 7, 1997, at A13, available in 1997 WL 10846547 (stating that
David Martin would represent Dunn during the remaining criminal proceedings).
172. See Vealey's Stipulation Withdrawing Appearance on Behalf of Defendant,
State v. Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 1997) (No. 96-1005A); Entry of Appearance
for Defendant by David Martin, State v. Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 1997) (No.
96-1005A); see also Vealey Interview, supra note 39 ("[I1f I'm going to argue on
behalf of what I did in the trial, what I didn't do in the trial, then I am, in effect,
arguing against my client, so we concluded that he would have to get new counsel
to argue the motion for a new trial.").
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Due to the constraints placed on Vealey by the attorney-client
privilege, 173 it was impossible for Judge Fortunato to create a
fully-developed record for appellate-court review. Therefore, postconviction relief, with its waiver of the attorney-client privilege,
represents the only option that allows Vealey to present a complete
17 4
defense.
D.

Counter-Arguments to Judge Fortunato'sSpecific Reasoning

1. Plain Error
If Rhode Island had a plain-error rule, then Judge Fortunato
could have ordered a new trial to remedy a defect like ineffective
assistance of counsel, which affected Dunn's substantial rights.
The federal plain-error rule, Rule 52(b), provides that the trial
judge may notice plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights
175
although they were not brought to the attention of the court.
Ineffective assistance of counsel, for example, affects one of a defendant's constitutional rights and the judicial proceeding's fairness. If the federal court discovers such a "miscarriage of justice,"
viz. ineffective assistance of counsel, then the plain error will war176
rant a reversal.
173. As previously mentioned, the three claims of ineffectiveness centered
around three decisions: (1) Vealey's failure to present character evidence, (2)
Dunn's waiver of jury trial and (3) Dunn's decision not to testify in his own defense. See supra notes 45-50; see also Vealey Interview, supra note 39 (discussing
the limitations that the attorney-client privilege creates for attorneys).
I cannot explain to him [Judge Fortunate] or anybody discussions I had
with my client about taking the stand [or] not taking the stand. I can't
tell the reasons why... what discussions I had with my client considering
waiver ofjury trial or the issue of putting on character evidence. There's
still that privilege. So yes, he can ask questions about that, but my explanations are limited by the attorney-client privilege.
Id.
174. See generally State v. Juarez, 570 A.2d 1118, 1119-20 (R.I. 1990) (describing the attorney-client privilege as covering confidential communications between
a client and his former attorney).
175. Compare Fed. R. Crim. P. 52 (providing that a court may notice plain errors sua sponte) with R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 52 (providing no mention of a
court's ability to notice plain errors sua sponte); see also United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (acknowledging appellate authority to recognize plain errors that affect substantial rights); Moore, supra note 117, § 652.04 (1997) (stating
that if the error affects the fairness of judicial proceedings, then the court will
consider a claim of plain error within the context of the entire trial).
176. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 737; Moore, supra note 117, § 652.04.
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Rhode Island has no such plain-error rule.' 7 7 It was specifically deleted from the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules because
the provision, "which was obviously intended to apply in appellate
proceedings," conflicted with Rhode Island case law. 17 8 As a general rule, appellate review is restricted to trial-court rulings to
which exceptions were taken. 179 When constitutional protections
are deprived, however, the Rhode Island Supreme Court will recognize such "plain" errors even though not objected to by the defendant.18o The supreme court, however, did not extend this power to
superior court judges. The explicit deletion of the plain-error rule
from Superior Court Rule 52 demonstrates that Judge Fortunato,
a superior court judge, lacks the appellate court's power to recognize constitutional errors not raised by the defendant at trial.' 8 '
Since a Rhode Island Superior Court judge cannot raise plain er177. See R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 52 Note 1 (citing State v. Williams, 432
A.2d 667 (R.I. 1981)) ("Rhode Island has not heretofore recognized the plain error
rule. Indeed, in promulgating rules of criminal procedure, Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which deals with plain error, was specifically
deleted to conform to Rhode Island case law.").
178. Id.
179. See R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 52 reporter's notes.
180. See generally State v. Quattrocchi 235 A.2d 99, 104 (R.I. 1967) (noting that
Rhode Island is not considered a jurisdiction "where plain error affecting substantial rights may be considered on review even though not raised at trial"). The exception to this rule, however, is in cases where parties are deprived of their
constitutional protections. See State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 731 (R.I. 1987).
[The Supreme Court's] review of questions concerning basic constitutional
rights, notwithstanding a defendant's failure to raise the issue at trial, is
limited to the following circumstances. First, the error complained of
must consist of more than harmless error. Second, the record must be
sufficient to permit a determination of the issue. Third, counsel's failure
to raise the issue is based upon a novel rule of law of which counsel could
not reasonably have known at the time of trial.
Id.
181. Dunn did not raise an ineffectiveness claim at the trial-court level. See
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial, State v. Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. June 30, 1997)
(No. 96-1005A); R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 52 reporter's notes. See generally State
v. Williams, 432 A.2d 667, 670 (R.I. 1981) (noting that "errors not asserted in the
trial court will only be considered under extraordinary circumstances wherein a
defendant has 'suffered an abridgment of his basic constitutional rights'") (quoting
State v. Frazier, 235 A.2d 886, 887 (R.I. 1967)). Since the right to assistance of
counsel is a constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment, the supreme court
may review it on appeal even though Dunn did not raise the allegation. See generally MacFadyen & Hurst, supra note 67, § 52.2, at 442 (stating that "[another]
reason for the limited applicability of Rule 52 is that, unlike the federal system,
Rhode Island does not permit error of law to be raised on motions for new trial").
Rhode Island Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 states that "[amny er-
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rors sua sponte and the only exception applies to the supreme
court, the appropriate, and only, vehicle for recognizing violations
of a defendant's constitutional rights at the superior-court level is
through a motion for post-conviction relief.182 Consequently,
Judge Fortunato overstepped his authority by granting a new trial
based on his claim that Dunn's Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel had been violated.' 8 3
Both the court and the legislature have afforded defendants
certain procedural safeguards in Rule 33 and section 10-9.1-1 of
the Rhode Island General Laws, respectively, for obtaining relief
from errors affecting constitutional rights. 8 4 Rule 33 allows a motion for a new trial in the interest of justice, and section 10-9.1-1
allows a party to bring a motion for post-conviction relief for errors
of constitutional magnitude.'8 6 Accordingly, a judge need not step
in after rendering a verdict when sufficient safeguards are available to protect a defendant's constitutional rights.' 8 6 The judge's
option is to deny the defendant's motion for a new trial and request, but not order, that he resubmit a motion on different
grounds.'8 7 Such a course of action preserves the sanctity of the
rules and also assures that a defendant would receive the full benefit of his rights under the rules and the state and federal Constitutions, either through a new trial or post-conviction relief.' 8 8
ror, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be

disregarded."
182. See supra section III.B.2; supra note 108.
183. See MacFadyen & Hurst, supra note 67, § 52.3, at 443. ("[Tlhe Court...
will grant direct review of questions regarding 'basic constitutional rights' that
were not raised at trial only when (1) the error asserted is not harmless; (2) the
recordpermits determination of the issue; and (3) the failure to raise the issue was
not due to its novelty.") (citing State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 731 (R.I. 1987)) (emphasis added).
184. R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-1 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
185. Compare R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33 with R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-1.
186. See Torcia, supra note 71, at 339 ("[A] trial judge retains the power, prior
to verdict or finding of guilty, to declare a mistrial and order a new trial on his own
motion, for 'manifest necessity.'") (citing United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579
(1824)).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Saban-Gutierrez, 783 F. Supp. 1538, 1549
(D.P.R. 1991). ("We can find no reason why this court cannot request of defendant
to move for a new trial,

..

if that is the remedy he seeks ....

Defendant is under no

obligation to file this motion."). But see supra note 108.
188. See R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33; R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-1.
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2. Rule 2: A Square Peg in a Round Hole
Judge Fortunato raised Rhode Island Superior Court Rule of
Criminal Procedure 2, describing the purpose and construction of
the rules, as a defense for his actions.' 8 9 Rule 2 comports with the
legislative intent to promote the speedy determination of litigation
on the merits. 190 One could argue that Judge Fortunato saved
time in bypassing the post-conviction relief proceeding. However,
Rule 2, while requiring a judge to construe the rules to avoid unjustifiable delay, does not sanction ignoring the clear meaning of
the court rules: "[inparticular, where a rule is free from ambiguity, and expresses a clear and definite meaning, it should be adhered to strictly." 19 1 Similarly, in Carlislev. United States,19 2 the
Court held that Federal Rule 2 should be used only to interpret
ambiguous rules.' 9 3 The language of Rule 33 clearly prohibits
judges from granting new-trial motions sua sponte. 19 4 Thus, Rule
189. See Judge Fortunato Interview, supra note 105; see also R.I. Super. Ct. R.
Crim. P. 2 ('These rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every
criminal proceeding to which they apply. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable
expense and delay.").
190. See R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 2 reporter's notes (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 86-2 (1956) (1969 Reenactment) (Supp. 1970)).
191. State v. DiStefano, 593 A.2d 1351 (R.I. 1991).
[It is well settled that when a statute is free from ambiguity and expresses a clear and definite meaning, we must impart to the words contained therein their plain and obvious meaning. Consequently, because a
rule of court has the full force and effect of law we must accord the rule
[Tiherefore . . . the clear and
the same principles of construction ....
unambiguous rule in this jurisdiction... must be adhered to strictly.
Id. at 1352. But see Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139, 142 (1964) (stating that
"the Rules are not, and were not intended to be, a rigid code to have an inflexible
meaning irrespective of the circumstances").
192. 116 S.Ct. 1460, 1465 (1996).
193. A judge cannot use Rule 2 to construe another rule as saying something
beyond its plain meaning. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 2. "Rule [21 ... sets forth a principle of interpretation to be used in construing ambiguous rules, not a principle of
law superseding clear rules that do not achieve the stated objectives. It does not,
that is to say, provide that rules shall be construed to mean something other than
what they plainly say. . ... " Id. Although the rules are subject to a case-by-case
application, they must also provide some element of predictability so that attorneys may plan their course of action without unduly endangering a just determination of their clients' criminal proceedings. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-6-2 (1956) (1997
Reenactment).
194. See supra section III.A.
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2 does nothing to justify Judge Fortunato's abrogation of Rule 33's
unambiguous meaning.
3.

ReinterpretingJudge Schwarzer and The Trial Judge's Role

Judge Fortunato cites Judge William Schwarzer to support his
purported ability to intervene on his own initiative, and thus ensure a "fair trial" and a "justoutcome" when defense attorneys are
providing ineffective assistance. 19 5 However, Judge Schwarzer's
account, by no means binding on a Rhode Island court or any other
court, does not support Judge Fortunato's actions. Both Judges
Fortunato and Schwarzer agree that when presiding over a trial, a
judge should seek to achieve fairness. 196 Judges Fortunato and
Schwarzer, however, advocate divergent methods for achieving
this fairness. 1 9 7 Judge Schwarzer recognizes that a judge must obtain fairness for the defendant by monitoring counsel's performance within the framework of the procedural rules.'9 8 Thus, the
trial judge's function within this framework, as he sees it, is to
remedy observed deficiencies before it is too late.199 Judge Fortunato's sua sponte motion was procedurally "too late," however,
because Rule 33 bans such action. Although Judge Schwarzer discusses a trial judge's post-trial options,2 0 0 he does not advocate a
195. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 24 app. at 329, State v.
Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 1997) (No. 96-1005A) (citing Schwarzer, supra note
53, at 633).
196. See Schwarzer, supra note 53, at 650.
197. See id.

Where the law affords [the judge] discretion in the application of substantive or procedural rules, fairness normally will guide its exercise. Since
the competence of counsel is an element of a fair trial, achieving fairness
will require the monitoring of counsel's performance and intervention in
appropriate circumstances. This does not require the judge to evaluate
the relative efficacy of trial tactics or to determine whether counsel's performance should receive a passing grade. Nor is the trial judge called
upon to rule whether counsel's performance satisfies one of the minimum
standards formulated by the appellate courts or whether a party is being
denied effective representation. Instead, his function is to remedy observed deficiencies before it is too late, resorting always to the least intrusive measure adequate to the need.
Id. (emphasis added).
198. See id. at 664.
199. See supra note 197.

200. See Schwarzer, supra note 53, at 664 ("To prevent a default [of post-trial
motions], therefore, the court may appropriately inquire whether counsel desires
to present any post-trial motions.").
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trial judge's granting a new trial on his own motion where the applicable rule forbids such action.2 0 1 Instead, Judge Schwarzer requires the least intrusive measure adequate to the defendant's
need for fairness. 20 2 Considering the possibilities for fairness
presented by Rule 33 and post-conviction relief, Judge Fortunato's
decision could hardly be described as the least intrusive measure.
4. Executive Order 95-02: An "Ineffective" Argument
In evaluating a defense attorney's ability to represent clients
in felony cases, Judge Fortunato cites Chief Justice Weisberger's
Executive Order 95-02 as an appropriate standard. 20 3 The executive order requires that an appointed defense attorney must (1) annually complete six hours of continuing legal education in criminal
law and procedure, (2) be a member of the Rhode Island Bar for at
least three years and (3) have previously represented, as either a
lead attorney or an associate counsel under the supervision of a
mentor attorney, any party in at least three Class One felony trials-cases with potential penalties of more than ten years in jailto verdict. 20 4 Though he met the second prong of the executive order, Judge Fortunato determined that Vealey failed to meet the
20 5
first and the third prongs.
Judge Fortunato conceded that this executive order applies
only to counsel assigned to indigent defendants. 20 6 However, he
reasoned that it is anomalous to create standards only for appointed counsel representing indigent defendants. 20 7 Therefore,
although he did not purport to amend the executive order, Judge
Fortunato believed that he had an obligation, based on the order,
to make a further inquiry into Vealey's criminal-trial experi201. Judge Schwarzer's discussion about achieving post-trial fairness and effective assistance of counsel demonstrates a marked deference to the rules governing
post-trial motions. See id.

202. See id. at 650.
203.

See Exec. Order No. 95-02 (1994-1995) R.I. (643-657 A.2d) LXXII (1995)

Exec. Order 95-02, cited in Judge Fortunato's Aug. 6th opinion, represents a correction of a typographic error. Exec. Order 95-01 at LXIV provided the substantive

text.
204. See id.; Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 19-20 app. at 326-27,
State v. Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 1997) (No. 96-1005A).
205. See id. at 19-20 app. at 327 (evaluating defense counsel's experience based
on the elements of the executive order).
206. See id. at 20-22 app. at 326-28.
207. See id. at 22 app. at 327-28.
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ence. 20 8 The reality is, however, that Chief Justice Weisberger's
executive order does not apply to all attorneys representing clients
in felony cases. Rather, it applies only to attorneys representing
indigent clients in felony cases. 20 9 Instead of covering privatelyprocured attorneys like Vealey, the executive order only provides
the indigent client with additional safeguards to guarantee fairness. 2 10 Therefore, Chief Justice Weisberger's executive order
should not be considered a measuring rod for every attorney in
Rhode Island until the chief justice makes it clear that such is his
intention.
5.

American Bar Association Standard 6-1.1: Everything But
the Kitchen Sink

In an effort to further buttress his sua sponte actions, Judge
Fortunato cites American Bar Association Standard 6-1.1: "[tlhe
adversary nature of the proceeding does not relieve the trial judge
of the obligation of raising on his or her own initiative at all appropriate times and in an appropriate manner, matters which may
significantly promote a just determination of the trial."2 1 1 However, this standard denies that which Judge Fortunato says it permits. The standard provides that a trial judge has an obligation to
raise on his own initiative matters that promote a just determination of the trial "at all appropriatetimes and in an appropriate
manner."2 12 Regardless of its tendency to promote a just determi208. See id.
209. See Exec. Order No. 95-02 (1994-1995) R.I. (643-657 A.2d) LXXII (1995).
See generally Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 22 app. at 328, Dunn
(No. 96-1005A) (comparing Vealey's level of experience to the elements of the executive order). Even though Judge Fortunato uses Chief Justice Weisberger's executive order to assess Vealey's level of experience, the executive order pertains only
to court appointments, a fact not lost to Judge Fortunato.
210. See supra note 49 (stating that the executive order was promulgated to
"provide competent representation, to ensure that the distribution of court appointments is made in a fair and equitable fashion, to provide a uniform and efficient system for making such appointments, and to protect the public interest");
State's Memorandum in Support of Writ of Certiorari at 41, State v. Dunn (R.I.
Nov. 18, 1997) (No. 97-414 M.P.) (arguing that the executive order does not apply
in Dunn because Vealey was privately procured); State v. Dowell (No. 95-383-A
slip op.) (R.I. Oct. 24, 1997).
211. Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 24 app. at 329, Dunn (No. 961005A) (quoting 1 A.B.A. Standards For Criminal Justice § 6-1.1 (2d ed. 1980)).
212. 1 A.B.A. Standards For Criminal Justice § 6-1.1 (2d ed. 1980) (emphasis
added).
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nation of the trial, a judge's grant of a new trial on his own motion
is an inappropriateaction in light of the other outlets that secure a
defendant's constitutional rights. 213 Moreover, although the standard could be construed as persuasive, it does not carry the same
statutory weight as a motion for post-conviction relief2 14 or a motion for a new trial.2 15 Therefore, any support that the standard
lends to Judge Fortunato's ineffectiveness claim is tenuous at best.
6.

McMann v. Richardson: Been There, Dunn That

Judge Fortunato reasons that a judge must seek to achieve,
through effective assistance of counsel, a just result for the defendant. 2 16 Accordingly, Judge Fortunato quotes McMann v. Richardson: "judges should strive to maintain proper standards of
performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in
criminal cases in their courts." 21 7 This quotation forms the latter
half of the following sentence which Judge Fortunato omits: "we
think the matter, for the most part, should be left to the good sense
and discretion of the trial courts with the admonition that if the
right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel."2 18 Section 8-6-2 of the Rhode Island General Laws provides
that only a majority of the superior court judges shall have the
power to promulgate court rules. 2 19 Rule 33, drafted by such a majority, and the motion for post-conviction relief, drafted by the state
legislature, represent the "good sense and discretion of the trial
courts," as well as the state legislature, in affording defendants the
full benefit of their constitutional rights. Judge Fortunato therefore did not need to grant a new trial sua sponte to satisfy McMann
when the rule governing new trials and the statute governing postconviction relief adequately safeguarded Dunn's constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel.
213. See R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33; R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-1 (1956) (1997
Reenactment).
214. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-1.
215. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-6-2 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
216. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 23 app. at 328, Dunn (No.
96-1005A) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
217. Id.
218. McMann, 397 U.S. at 771.
219. R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-6-2.
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Both the text of Rule 33 and the rule's policy background forbid Judge Fortunato's actions in Dunn. Although his outside policy arguments are novel, they are irrelevant to Rule 33 on both
textual and policy grounds.
IV.

ANALYZING JUDGE FORTUNATO'S GROUNDS FOR GRANTING

THE NEw TRIAL
When Judge Fortunato granted Dunn a new trial on his own
particular grounds, he breached the confines of his judicial power.
But assuming arguendo that Judge Fortunato was within his
power in granting Dunn a new trial, both of his grounds for doing
so were meritless. Judge Fortunato's two particular grounds were
(1) newly discovered evidence, e.g., letters he received after trial,
and (2) "in the interest of justice," ineffectiveness of counsel. 2 20 In
Dunn, the evidence was not newly discovered. Moreover, Vealey's
performance satisfied Dunn's constitutional right to assistance of
counsel because a judge may not retrospectively question a defense
counsel's reasonable strategic decisions at trial.
A. Newly-Discovered Evidence
In Rhode Island, a defense attorney may introduce evidence of
his client's good character. 2 2 1 However, such introduction "opens
the door" for the prosecution to introduce rebuttal evidence of the
defendant's bad character. 22 2 With some exceptions, a defense attorney introduces character evidence in the form of reputation or
opinion testimony. 22 3 In certain circumstances, the prosecution, in
220. See supra section I.C.
221. Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1) provides that:
(a) Evidence of a pertinent trait of a person's character or a trait of the
person's character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he or
she acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Evidence of a pertinent trait of the accused's character offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; ...
Id.; see also State v. Speaks, 691 A.2d 547, 550 (R.I. 1997) ("It is true that evidence
of a pertinent character trait of the accused may be admissible when offered by the
defendant to show that he or she acted in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion.").
222. See R.I. R. Evid. 404(a)(1); State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d 879, 887 (R.I.
1996) (stating that character evidence was improperly admitted because defendant
did not place his character in issue).
223. Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 405 provides that:
(a) ...In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of
a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation
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response, may introduce evidence of a defendant's other crimes,
wrongs or acts.2 24 In Dunn, Judge Fortunato claimed that he discovered new evidence of Dunn's good character after his initial ver2 25
dict, thus justifying a new trial.
In order to grant a new trial based on newly-discovered character evidence, a defendant must satisfy a two-prong test:
The first prong is a four-part inquiry that requires that the
evidence be (1) newly-discovered since trial, (2) not discoverable prior to trial with the exercise of due diligence, (3) not
merely cumulative or impeaching but rather material to the
issue upon which it is admissible, (4) of the type which would
probably change the verdict at trial. Once this first prong is
satisfied, the second prong calls for the hearing justice to determine if the evidence presented is "credible enough to warrant a new

22 6

trial."

The Rhode Island Supreme Court has further elucidated this
test-the defendant must show that, if he or she could have used
and developed the evidence discovered post-trial, then a "significant chance" exists that such evidence would have raised enough
2 27
reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds to avoid conviction.
or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination,inquiry
is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) ... In cases in which character or trait [of] character of a person is an
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, or when evidence is offered under Rule 404(b), proof may also be made of specific instances of
his conduct.
Id. (emphasis added).
224. Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or to prove that defendant feared imminent
bodily harm and that the fear was reasonable.
Id.
225. Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 5-7 app. at 319-20, State v.
Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 1997) (No. 96-1005A); see also supra notes 44-45 and
accompanying text (discussing the letters depicting Dunn's good character which
Judge Fortunato received post-trial).
226. State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310, 321 (R.I. 1997) (quoting State v. Hernandez,
641 A.2d 62, 72 (R.I. 1994)); see also State v. Morejon, 603 A.2d 730, 736 (R.I. 1992)
(applying the same two-prong test); State v. Brown, 528 A.2d 1098, 1104 (R.I.
1987) (same).
227. Mastracchio v. Moran, 698 A.2d 706, 719 (R.I. 1997).
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The First Prong of the Newly-Discovered Evidence Test

The potential character evidence represented by the post-trial
letters does not satisfy the first prong of the Newly-Discovered Evidence test. 228 With respect to the first inquiry of the first prong,
the post-trial letters were not newly discovered since trial.
Although the actual character letters sent to Judge Fortunato after
the verdict were newly discovered since trial, the letter writers
themselves, who would have been the potential character witnesses for the defense at trial, were known to the defense before
trial.2 29 Defense counsel was aware that these witnesses could testify at trial as to Dunn's character. 2 30 One of the letter writers
actually did testify, although not to the contents of her letter, at
trial. 23 1 Thus, the potential character evidence was available and
228. See supra note 226.
229. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 14 app. at 323-24, Dunn
(No. 96-1005A). But see State's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 40, State v. Dunn (R.I. Nov. 18, 1997) (No. 97-414 M.P.) ("[Tihe letters referred to by the court did not constitute admissible trial evidence in any
way, shape, or form, but rank hearsay brought to the court's attention after the
verdict. Insofar as he relied upon this unsworn, unauthenticated material as a
basis for his ruling, Justice Fortunato again stepped outside the parameters of
judicial authority vested in him by Rule 33."). Rhode Island Rule of Evidence
801(c) declares that "'[h]earsay' is a statement [an oral or written assertion], other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." R.I. R. Evid. 801(c). But see
R.I. R. Evid. 803(21) (providing a hearsay exception for evidence of reputation of a
person's character in the community); Respondent's Memorandum in Support of
Objection to Petition for Certiorari, State v. Dunn (R.I. Feb. 16, 1998) (No. 97-414
M.P.) (supporting Judge Fortunato's claim that Vealey did not adequately investigate the potential value of good-character evidence).
230. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 16 app. at 323-24, Dunn
(No. 96-1005A) ("[Judge Fortunato's] question was, 'Did you discuss with them, his
reputation within the community for nonviolence or peacefulnessT Answer [by
Vealey]: 'I don't believe I directly asked that question of the persons I was interviewing, but there was some indications from those persons as to what kind of
person he was and his character.'"); see also State's Memorandum in Support of
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Dunn (No. 97-414 M.P.) ("Vealey related that
he informed Monsignor Dunn of his right to place before the court his reputation
for peacefulness along with specific instances of peaceful or non-violent behavior.
He also spoke with persons acquainted for a number of years with the complainant
and Monsignor Dunn, though the discussions did not include specific instances
where the respondent exhibited a reluctance to employ violence."). But see Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Objection to Petition for Certiorari at 20, Dunn
(No. 97-414 M.P.) (arguing that Vealey failed to investigate properly potential
character witnesses).
231. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 8 app. at 320-21, Dunn
(No. 96-1005A).
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known by the defendant and defense counsel, and could have been
23 2
developed by them for their use during the trial.
The potential character evidence does not satisfy the first
prong's second inquiry because the evidence was indeed discoverable prior to trial with the exercise of due diligence. The information revealed by the letters was readily available to Dunn and
Vealey. 23 3 The State provided Vealey with a list of potential State
witnesses. 2 34 Vealey also interviewed members of the community,
some of whom were interviewed on Dunn's behalf.23 5 Moreover,
Vealey was aware that these individuals could testify to Dunn's
good character. Good-character evidence, it is conceded, could
change the verdict at trial, provided it was directly connected to
the issue of the charge. 236 However, Vealey consciously made a
strategic choice to forego such character evidence so as not to open
the door to the State's potential bad-character witnesses. 23 7 Nev232. See State v. Hernandez, 641 A.2d 62, 74 (R.I. 1994).
233. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 14 app. at 324, Dunn (No.
96-1005A).
234. See id. at 16 app. at 325.
235. See id.
Defense counsel failed to interview [a potential witness] in the nine
months after [defendant's) arrest, nor did he interview her during the remaining twelve or so months before trial. Defense counsel was not diligent in attempting to discover this evidence for use at trial .... The trial
justice correctly concluded that the land-evidence records had been available to [defendant] before trial and could have been developed by her for
her use during the original trial.
Hernandez, 641 A.2d at 73-74. See generally Defendant's Motion in Limine, State
v. Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. June 12, 1997) (No. 96-1005A) (illustrating Vealey's attempt to block the State's 404(b) witnesses). In Dunn, if Vealey had used or developed the potential good-character evidence to which Judge Fortunato refers, then
he would have opened the door to the State's bad-character evidence, thus nullifying his efforts, via his motion in limine, to keep such evidence out.
236. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 12 app. at 322-23, Dunn
(No. 96-1005A) ("The circumstances may be such that an established reputation
for good character, if it is relevant to the issue, would alone create a reasonable
doubt, although without it the other evidence would be convincing.") (quoting Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361, 366 (1896)). Edgington involved a charge of
making a false deposition in aid of a fraudulent pension claim. If character evidence could introduce reasonable doubt under circumstances involving a charge of
making a false deposition, then such evidence would be at least equally as powerful where the charge is second-degree sexual assault.
237. See, e.g., Testimony of Lucille Farr at 37-39, State v. Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct.
June 12-13, 1997) (No. 96-1005A) (describing Vealey's efforts to keep out the
State's 404(b) witnesses). See generally Defendant's Motion in Limine, Dunn (No.
96-1005A) (depicting Vealey's investigation of the State's bad-character evidence);
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ertheless, this character evidence was discoverable pre-trial with
the exercise of due diligence.
The potential character evidence fails the third inquiry of the
first prong because it was not material to the issue to which it
would have been admissible, e.g., whether Dunn used force on one
occasion to cause sexual penetration. 2 38 In evaluating newly-discovered evidence claims, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has defined "material evidence" as evidence having a reasonable
probability of denying the defendant a fair trial by undermining
confidence in the original verdict and producing a different result.2 39 Concededly, the letters describing Dunn as kind, gentle
and generous and "not a person to use force and violence," 2 4° represent evidence of reputation and opinion of a pertinent trait of the
defendant's character which tend to negate an essential element of
the charge, e.g., the use of force. However, based on the aforementioned definition of material, the evidence cannot be defined as
such. Thus, the evidence fails the third inquiry for the same reasons that it fails the fourth. The character evidence, therefore, is

Defendant's Motion to Suppress/Motion for Preliminary Evidentiary Hearing,
State v. Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. June 12, 1997) (No. 96-1005A) (same); Defendant's
Motion to Suppress/Motion for Preliminary Evidentiary Hearing, State v. Dunn
(R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 1996) (No. 96-1005A) (same); Defendant's Motion to Compel More Responsive Answer to Defendant's Motion for Bill of Particulars, State v.
Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 1996) (No. 96-1005A) (same); see also Vealey Interview, supra note 39 ("We had filed extensive motions in limine to exclude a number
of... bad-character witnesses that the State was looking to have testify .... all
the 404(b) witnesses the State looked to introduce were kept out based upon our
motion .... Well it seems to me... that it would be a little unusual to close the
door on the bad-character evidence and have the State bring in all the people that
you fought to keep out in the first place."); State's Memorandum in Support of
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, State v. Dunn (R.I. Nov. 18, 1997) (No. 97-414
M.P.) ("Through discovery, he [Vealeyl had been made aware of a number of individuals other than Ms. Ryan available to the State as rebuttal witnesses should he
'open the door' by presenting character evidence on behalf of his client."). But see
Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Objection to Petition for Certiorari at 20,
State v. Dunn (R.I. Feb. 16, 1998) (No. 97-414 M.P.) (arguing that Vealey's failure
to investigate potential character witnesses adversely affected the defense).
238. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 9-10 app. at 321, Dunn
(No. 96-1005A).
239. Broccoli v. Moran, 698 A.2d 720, 726 (R.I. 1997) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley,
514 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1995)).
240. Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 5-6, 10 app. at 319, 321-22,
Dunn (No. 96-1005A).
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not material because it does not create a reasonable probability of
241
a different result.
Finally, the potential character evidence fails the fourth inquiry of the first prong. If Vealey had introduced the character evidence, the State would have rebutted that proffer by introducing
its bad-character evidence. The effect of the bad-character evidence would have either negated the effect of the good-character
evidence or further damaged Dunn's case. 2 4 2 Therefore, introduc-

tion of the character evidence, at the least, would not have benefitted Dunn's case. At the worst, introducing the character evidence
would have irreparably damaged Dunn's case. In any event, however, the character evidence would not have led to a different
43
result. 2
2.

The Second Prong of the Newly-Discovered Evidence Test

If the first prong's four inquiries are satisfied, then the court
may move to the second prong: whether the alleged "new" evi241. See Broccoli, 698 A.2d at 726; State v. Charette, 688 A.2d 1286, 1289 (R.I.
1997). But see Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 6-7 app. at 320, Dunn
(No. 96-1005A) (stating that the newly-discovered character evidence created a
reasonable probability of a different result). See generally Mastracchio v. Moran,
698 A.2d 706, 714-15 (R.I. 1997) (discussing the elements of materiality in relation
to alleged newly-discovered evidence).
242. See State's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
20, Dunn (No. 97-414 M.P.) ("A number of other people had given statements indicating that Monsignor Dunn had used force or violence in order to obtain sex; some
claimed that he had plied them with drugs and alcohol to lower their resistance.
Other allegations against the respondent involved bestiality, satanic worship and
other perverse behavior."). But see generally Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Objection to Petition for Certiorari at 24, Dunn (No. 97-414 M.P.) (claiming
that Vealey did not properly investigate the State's potential bad-character
witnesses).
243. See generally Record at 254, State v. Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. June 24, 1997)
(No. 96-1005A). In light of the State's case against Dunn, as well as evidence kept
out through Vealey's decision to "close the door" to bad-character evidence, admitting this newly-discovered good-character evidence would not have created reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds to avoid conviction. See, e.g., State's Memorandum
in Support of Petition for Certiorari, Dunn (No. 97-414 M.P.) (reiterating Judge
Fortunato's claim that Vealey did not properly investigate the potential value of
good-character evidence); Mastracchio, 698 A.2d 706, 719 (R.I. 1997) (discussing
the defense's burden of showing that newly-discovered evidence would create a significant chance of reasonable doubt in enough juror's minds to avoid conviction).
But see Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Objection to Petition for Certiorari at 23, Dunn (No. 97-414 M.P.) (arguing that Vealey's failure to investigate
bad-character witnesses caused him to forego potential good-character evidence
that may have aided his client's case).
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dence is credible enough to warrant a new trial. 2 44 In doing so, a
judge must exercise independent judgment regarding a particular
witness's credibility and what weight, if any, should be given to the
witness's testimony. 24 5 Since the first prong of the test for newlydiscovered evidence was not satisfied, analyzing the second prong
is unnecessary. 2 46 However, assuming arguendo that the character evidence met the first prong, Judge Fortunato would still fail
the second prong. In his August 6th opinion, Judge Fortunato did
not attempt to discover whether the potential witnesses were credible to testify. 24 7 Without such a credibility determination from
Judge Fortunato or Vealey, the character evidence cannot satisfy
the second prong of the test.
3.

Hypothetically Speaking, It's Still Not Newly-Discovered
Evidence

Hypothetically, Judge Fortunato could make two arguments
in support of his newly-discovered evidence claim. On further
analysis, however, neither argument would withstand the newlydiscovered evidence test.
a.

The CharacterEvidence: Newly Discovered by Whom?

First, Judge Fortunato could postulate that the newly-discovered evidence test includes a loophole allowing him to raise successfully the ground of the newly-discovered character evidence.
Specifically, although Vealey was personally aware of the potential
244. See State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310, 322 (R.I. 1997); see also State v. Hernandez, 641 A.2d 62, 72 (R.I. 1994) (quoting State v. Brown, 528 A.2d 1098, 1104
(R.I. 1987) (stating the need to evaluate whether newly-discovered evidence is
credible enough to warrant a new trial)).
245. See State v. Morejon, 603 A.2d 730, 737 (R.I. 1992).
246. See Hernandez, 641A.2d at 72 ("If this four-pronged threshold analysis is
satisfied, the trial judge must then determine whether the newly-discovered evidence is 'credible enough to warrant a new trial.'") (quoting Brown, 528 A.2d at
1104)); see also State v. Brown, 619 A.2d 828, 833 (R.I 1993) ("[Iln passing upon
this motion [for new trial], the trial justice observed that this evidence could by
reasonable diligence have been discovered .... This finding was conclusive. The
evidence was not newly-discovered.").
247. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 15 app. at 324, Dunn (No.
96-1005A) ("Whether people in possession of such information would be credible at
trial, and would withstand cross-examination is, of course, another question, but
this was not appropriately investigated."). But see Vealey Interview, supra note 39
(recognizing that in order to avoid the State's bad-character evidence, Vealey chose
not to place his client's character in issue).
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character evidence found in the letters, Judge Fortunato was not
24
so personally aware until he received the letters after judgment. 8
Thus, with no knowledge of the letters until after judgment, he satisfied the first inquiry of the first prong.2 49 However, if Judge Fortunato could grant the motion sua sponte on the grounds of newlydiscovered evidence, then he still must satisfy not only the remaining inquiries of the first prong of the test but the second prong as
well.2 50 If one views the test from either Vealey's or Judge Fortunato's perspective, the above arguments regarding materiality,
whether the evidence would change the verdict and whether it was
credible enough to warrant a new trial remain the same. 2 5 1 Thus,
the only part of the test that one must analyze from Judge Fortunato's perspective is the second inquiry of the first prong:
whether the evidence was discoverable prior to trial with due
diligence.
Judge Fortunato was not diligent in discovering potential
character evidence on Dunn's behalf, thus failing the second inquiry of the first prong. Significantly, he granted Vealey's motions
in limine to keep out the State's bad-character evidence. 25 2 Vealey
based his motion in limine in part on State v. Quattrocchi.2 53 In
Quattrocchi,the supreme court held that character evidence was
improperly admitted into evidence, in violation of Rule 404(b), because the defendant did not place his character in issue.2 54 Thus,
it would be incongruous for Vealey to make a motion in limine to
keep out 404(b) bad-character evidence and yet open the door to
such evidence by making Dunn's good character an issue under
248. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 5 app. at 319, Dunn (No.
96-1005A).
249. See supra note 226.
250. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
251. See supra section IV.A.1 & 2.
252. See Defendant's Motion in Limine, Dunn (No. 96-1005A); see also Vealey
Interview, supra note 39 ("We had extensive hearing and argument on our motion
in limine and we made the motion based on State v. Quattrocchi and a number of
other cases about the issue of the admissibility of bad character .... IT~he judge
granted our motion to exclude all those witnesses.").
253. 681 A.2d 879 (R.I. 1996).
254. See id. at 887 ("Even though defendant testified in this case, after learning
that the other-crimes evidence would be admitted, he did not purport to place his
character in issue. Consequently we believe that the devastating evidence relating
to the sexual incidents ... was improperly admitted in violation of Rule 404(b)."),
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404(a)(1). 25 5 Considering the motion in limine and the State's potential for introducing bad-character evidence, if Judge Fortunato,
or Vealey, for that matter, conducted a further search for goodcharacter evidence, then such a search would have been illogical.
b.

Graspingat Straws: Is Ineffective Assistance Also NewlyDiscovered Evidence?

As a second hypothetical argument, Judge Fortunato could argue that evidence of Vealey's ineffectiveness was only brought to
his attention post-trial. 2 56 Thus, he could argue that the evidence
of Vealey's ineffectiveness was newly discovered and the ineffectiveness claim could be brought under the rubric of newly-discovered evidence. 2 57 This reasoning would fail, however, for two
reasons. First, Judge Fortunato, based on his reasoning in the August 6th opinion, could have discovered this "evidence," e.g.,
Vealey's alleged lack of experience, with due diligence by inquiring
into Vealey's background either pre-trial or during trial.25 8 Second, the evidence of Vealey's ineffectiveness would not have
changed the verdict at trial for the very fact that he was not
2 59
ineffective.
Based on the foregoing analysis, Judge Fortunato's potential
character evidence does not withstand the newly-discovered evidence test. In addition, the two hypothetical arguments posited
above do not offer support for his claim that newly-discovered evidence justified a new trial. Therefore, Judge Fortunato cannot
base his decision to grant Dunn a new trial on the ground of newlydiscovered evidence.
255. See supra notes 221, 242. See generally Defendant's Motion in Limine,
Dunn (No. 96-1005A) (referring to the State's potential 404(b) witnesses).
256. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 4-5 app. 319, State v.
Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 1997) (No. 96-1005A).
257. See United States v. Garcia, 19 F.3d 1123, 1126 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating
that "evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel 'is not newly-discovered evidence
for purposes of a motion for a new trial where the facts supporting the claim were
within the defendant's knowledge at the time of trial'") (quoting United States v.
Seago, 930 F.2d 482, 489 (6th Cir. 1991)).
258. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 19-22, app. at 326-28,
Dunn (No. 96-1005A) (relying on Chief Justice Weisberger's executive order to
evaluate Vealey's experience).
259. See supra section IV.B.
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B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (In the Interest of Justice)
Applying Rhode Island and United States Supreme Court precedent, Judge Fortunato's second ground for granting Dunn a new
trial, e.g., ineffective assistance of counsel, fails to support his
decision.
1.

The Defendant Must Raise the Ineffectiveness Argument

Both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and Article 1, section 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution provide
the right to assistance of counsel to accused persons only. 26 0 Judge
Fortunato, a superior court judge, may not assert this right on
Dunn's behalf. Since a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
involves the defendant's constitutional rights, it is only appropriate
26 1
that the defendant, and not the trial judge, raise the claim.
When evaluating whether defense counsel has rendered effective assistance to a defendant, the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in
State v. Brennan,26 2 adopted the test set forth in Strickland v.
Washington.2 63 The Strickland test provides that the defendant
2 64
must raise the ineffectiveness argument:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of
a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable ....

The bench-

mark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the
trial cannot be re26 5
result.
just
a
produced
having
as
on
lied
260. U.S. Const. amend. VI; R.I. Const. art. 1, § 10.
261. But see section III.D. (discussing the Rhode Island Supreme Court's power
to recognize errors affecting constitutional rights even if not raised by the

defendant).
262. 627 A.2d 842 (R.I. 1993).
263. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
264. See State v. Brennan, 627 A.2d 842, 845 (R.I. 1993) (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687).
265. Id. (emphasis added)
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At the time he motioned the court for a new trial, Dunn did not
266
assert a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Therefore, Judge Fortunato overstepped his authority by asserting
this right to counsel on Dunn's behalf. Moreover, even if Dunn had
asserted that his right to counsel had been violated, Vealey acted
within the scope of representation guaranteed all accused persons-his assistance was effective.
2.

The Ineffectiveness Claim Fails the First Prong of the
Strickland Test

Judge Fortunato's claim that Vealey was ineffective is meritless because courts shall not deem attorneys ineffective for making
reasonable strategic trial choices: "[Tihe defendant must overcome
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy'.. . . The first part of
the Strickland test can be met only if a party shows 'that counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.'" 26 7 To assess fairly an attorney's performance, a judge must
accord substantial deference to the ambit of the attorney's decision-making. 2 68 Accordingly, he must make every effort to avoid
the "distorting effects of hindsight,"269 to reconstruct the circumstances of the challenged conduct and to analyze that conduct from
270
the attorney's perspective at that time.
Vealey's performance does not satisfy the first part of the
Strickland ineffectiveness test because his performance was not
deficient. Vealey's decision not to raise character evidence because
of the possibility of opening the door to bad-character evidence was
27 2
a strategic choice. 2 71 Like the attorney in Jacques v. State,
266. See Defendant's Motion for a New Trial, Dunn (No. 96-1005A); see also
Vealey Interview, supra note 39 (emphasizing Dunn's want of claiming that
Vealey's assistance violated his Sixth Amendment rights).
267. Brennan, 627 A.2d at 845 ("The proper measure of attorney performance
remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms ....
[Tihe
performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.") (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
268. See Brown v. Moran, 534 A.2d 180, 182 (R.I. 1987) (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689).
269. Id.
270. See id.; LaChappelle v. State, 686 A.2d 924, 927 (R.I. 1996); Brennan, 627
A.2d at 852.
271. See Brown, 534 A.2d at 182-83 (holding that a strategic choice to withhold
character evidence, after reasonable investigation, does not rise to the level of inef-
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Vealey considered the likelihood that the State would put on counterweight character witnesses. 2 73 In addition, Vealey's pretrial
discovery evinces an awareness of the State's potential bad-character witnesses. 2 74 Although Vealey did not contact these potential
bad-character witnesses, he knew the subject of their testimony
and their availability to the State. 27 5 He simply made a strategic
choice not to place Dunn's character in issue, thereby denying the
State an opportunity to present these bad-character witnesses. In
doing so, Vealey strategically pursued his client's best interests by
minimizing the risk that the State would exploit such testi-

fectiveness). "The trial justice determined that trial counsel was aware of the witnesses and evidence available concerning petitioner's alleged intoxication. He
further determined that trial counsel, after reasonable investigation, made a strategic choice that his testimony would not be helpful to petitioner." Id.; see also
Jacques v. State, 669 A.2d 1124, 1149 (R.I. 1995) ("'[A] tactical decision which later
proves to be a less feasible choice than the one made will not in and of itself be a
basis for a claim of deprivation of the right to effective counsel.' The decision to not
call witnesses was such a 'tactical decision' the defendant would have to live
with.") (quoting State v. Welch, 330 A.2d 400, 401-02 (R.I. 1975)); Brennan, 627
A.2d 842, 852 (R.I. 1993) (holding that the court will not second guess trial counsel's strategic choices which are "clearly reasonable and within the bounds of
representation").
272. 669 A.2d 1124 (R.I. 1995).
273. See id. at 1148-49 (describing the defense attorney's use of only one character witness, after he assessed the likelihood that the State would use counterweight witnesses in rebuttal, as representing a tactical choice reasonable under
the circumstances).
274. See supra note 238.
275. See Letters from Phyllis Hutnack to the Attorney General (Oct. 10, 1995;
Mar. 5, 1996; Dec. 6, 1996) (on file at the Rhode Island Superior Court (No. 961005A)); Letter from Kathleen Moriarty Crist to the Attorney General (May 6,
1997) (on file at the Rhode Island Superior Court (No. 96-1005A)); Defendant's Motion in Limine, State v. Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. June 12, 1997) (No. 96-1005A);
State's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 50, State v.
Dunn (R.I. Nov. 18, 1997) (No. 97-414 M.P.). But see Respondent's Memorandum
in Support of Objection to Petition for Certiorari, State v. Dunn (R.I. Feb. 16, 1998)
(No. 97-414 M.P.) (alleging that Vealey's failure to investigate potential character
witnesses impaired his judgment).
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mony. 27 6 Thus,

he made a reasonable strategic decision to avoid
bad-character evidence. 27 7
potential
the State's
a. Vealey Performed According to ProfessionalNorms
In evaluating attorney performance, the Strickland test requires an inquiry into professional norms. 2 78 Judge Fortunate
cited American Bar Association Standard 4-4.1-1 as an appropriate
touchstone for an attorney's performance: "[ult is the duty of the
lawyer to ... explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the
merits of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction." 27 9
However, Vealey had no need to investigate further potential goodcharacter evidence if his trial strategy, evident from his motion in
limine and his decision not to question defense witnesses about
Dunn's character, was to keep out the State's bad-character evidence. 28 0 Expecting Vealey to investigate evidence that, by virtue
of his motion in limine, would not factor into the trial is tantamount to superfluous work. The American Bar Association standard does not require such extra work, but rather requires an
attorney to explore all matters relevant to the case and its potential penalty.
276. See Defendant's Motion in Limine, Dunn (No. 96-1005A); State's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 50, Dunn (No. 97-414 M.P.);
see also Emerson v. Gramley, 91 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 1996), rehearingand suggestion for rehearingdenied, certioraridenied 117 S. Ct. 1260 (1997), certiorari
denied Gilmore v. Emerson, 117 S. Ct. 1289 (1997) ("[The defense attorney] could
have refused to call the witnesses, . . because the decision whether or not to call a
witness is a lawyer's tactical decision on which consultation with the client is not
required ....
This is provided that the decision rests on an adequate foundation.... ."). In the present case, Vealey did discuss with Dunn his right to place his
reputation before the court. But see Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Objection to Petition for Certiorari, Dunn (No. 97-414 M.P.) (alleging that Vealey performed deficiently and thus, prejudiced the defense).
277. See Brown v. Moran, 534 A.2d 180, 182 (R.I. 1982) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
278. Strickland, 477 U.S. at 686-87 (stating that "[tihe proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms").
279. 1 A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice § 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1980); see also
Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 15 app. at 324, State v. Dunn (R.I.
Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 1997) (No. 96-1005A) (comparing § 4-4.1 to Vealey's
performance).
280. See Defendant's Motion in Limine, Dunn (No. 96-1005A); Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 8 app. at 320-21, Dunn (No. 96-1005A).
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In his August 6th opinion, Judge Fortunato mentioned that a
letter writer who testified at trial was not asked about Dunn's
character "for some reason." 2 8 ' It seems logical to infer that, in
order to keep the door closed to the State's bad-character evidence,
Vealey did not ask this witness about Dunn's good character.
Vealey thus foreclosed the State's ability to present rebuttal badcharacter evidence by choosing not to put Dunn's character in issue. 28 2 Therefore, it was unnecessary for Vealey to investigate further good-character witnesses because they were not going to
testify. In Kimmelman v. Morrison,2 3 the Supreme Court declared that, in order to afford a defendant an ample opportunity to
meet the prosecution's case, an attorney must either investigate or
make a reasonable decision not to investigate the prosecution's
case. 28 4 Vealey reasonably investigated the State's case through

his discovery motions, thus complying with Kimmelman's mandate. 28 5 From this information he gathered through discovery as
well as information provided by his client, Vealey used his discretion and made a reasonable decision not to investigate further
2 6
character evidence. 8
281. Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 8 app. at 321, Dunn (No. 961005A).
282. See State's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
49, State v. Dunn (R.I. Nov. 18, 1997) (No. 97-414 M.P.) (Had Vealey chosen to
place character witnesses on the stand to testify to Monsignor Dunn's gentle, nonforceful nature, the State had the option of presenting evidence that he was capable of exerting the force necessary to commit sexual assault."); see also R.I. R. Evid.
404(a)(1) (allowing the State to rebut a defendant's good-character evidence). But
see Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Objection to Petition for Certiorari,
State v. Dunn (R.I. Feb. 16, 1998) (No. 97-414 M.P.) (arguing that Vealey's failure
to investigate the State's bad-character evidence caused Dunn to forego valuable
good-character evidence).
283. 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
284. See id. at 385 ("Respondent's lawyer neither investigated, nor made a reasonable decision not to investigate, the State's case through discovery. Such a
complete lack of pretrial preparation puts at risk ... the defendant's right to an
'ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution.'"); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) ("[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations
unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate
must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a
heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments.").
285. See supra notes 274-76.
286. See State's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
20 app. at 20, Dunn (No. 97-414 M.P.) (referring to discovery); Vealey Interview,
supra note 39 ("IT]he judge doesn't know everything about... this case, my client,
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The Alleged Conflict of Interest Is Irrelevant

As an additional basis for his ineffectiveness claim, Judge Fortunato raised a conflict-of-interest argument involving a potential
State witness. 28 7 Vealey did not contact this State witness because
she was also a plaintiff in a civil lawsuit against Dunn; as such,
Vealey was prohibited from approaching her. 28 8 Judge Fortunato
concluded that failure to investigate because of an actual conflict,
acknowledged by defense counsel, raises a dilemma that impacts
2 9
the constitutional right to have the assistance of counsel.
Vealey's decision, however, was not unreasonable under the circumstances. Concededly, Vealey could have contacted the State
witness's attorney. This action was unnecessary, however, because
Vealey already knew, through lengthy, periodically updated letters
that she had written to the prosecutor describing her allegations,
whether her testimony at the criminal trial would rebut possible
character evidence. 290 Since contacting this witness was unnecessary, the fact that she filed a civil suit against Dunn does not create a conflict of interest for Vealey in the criminal trial. Thus, he
had no need to investigate this witness further on behalf of his
client.
in terms of... other pending civil cases against him, other people that... I may
know, I may know of in terms of... my information that I received from my client."). But see Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Objection to Petition for
Certiorari, Dunn (No. 97-414 M.P.) (arguing that the alleged conflict of interest
crippled the defense).
287. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 16-17 app. at 324, State v.
Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 1997) (No. 96-1005A).
288. See R.I. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4.2 (providing that "[iun representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a party a lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by
law to do so"); Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 17 app. at 325, Dunn
(No. 96-1005A).
289. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 17 app. at 325, Dunn (No.
96-1005A) (quoting Culyer v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980)); see also U.S.
Const. amend. VI (providing the right to assistance of counsel to accused persons);
R.I. Const. art 1, § 10 (same).
290. See, e.g., Letters from Phyllis Hutnack to the Attorney General (Oct. 10,
1995; Mar. 5, 1996; Dec. 6, 1996) (on file at the Rhode Island Superior Court (No.
96-1005A)); see also Vealey Interview, supra note 39 ("[It's not the situation where
we have someone's name and we don't know what they're [sic] going to testify to
.... We had every indication of what she was going to say when she testified. In
fact, we used that information in our 404(b)... motion in limine.').
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c.

State v. Franklin and the Waiver of a Jury Trial

Judge Fortunato stated that Vealey's inexperience tainted
Dunn's waiver of a jury trial. 29 1 However, advising Dunn to waive
his right to a jury trial represents sound trial strategy. State v.
Franklin,2 9 2 read in conjunction with the Rhode Island and federal
Constitutions, provides the basis for two counter-arguments to
Judge Fortunato's claim. First, the right to a jury trial, like the
right to assistance of counsel, is the defendant's right under the
Rhode Island and United States Constitutions. 29 3 Franklin provides that "[ulnquestionably, defendant, in the exercise of his free
choice, had the right to dispense with his basic constitutional right
to a jury trial."2 94 Since the defendant possesses not only the right
to a jury trial but also the concomitant right to dispense with it,
Judge Fortunato, a superior court judge, cannot claim a violation
of this right on Dunn's behalf.2 95 The second counter-argument
draws from the Franklin test for the improper waiving of the right
to a jury trial. Franklin requires that a defendant, in order to
show that his right to a jury trial was improperly waived, must
satisfy three elements. First, a defendant must make a plain
2 96
showing that his waiver was not freely and intelligently waived.
Second, he must sustain the burden of proving essential unfairness
resulting from waiver of a jury trial. 29 7 Third, the defendant must
sustain that burden not as a matter of speculation but as a "demonstrable reality."298 In addition, Franklin implicitly provides
that the defendant, not a superior court judge, must satisfy these
291. See supra section I.C.
292. 241 A.2d 219 (R.I. 1968).
293. U.S. Const. amend. VI; R.I. Const. art 1, § 10; see also State v. Moran, 605
A.2d 494, 496 (R.I. 1992) (stating that "Rhode Island law is well settled that a
criminally accused defendant has an absolute right to waive a trial by jury if the
waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary"). But see Moran, 605 A.2d at 496
(providing that "there is no Federal Constitutional right to a jury waived trial")
(citing Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 85 (1965)).
294. Franklin,241 A.2d at 222 (R.I. 1968) (citing Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930)); see
generally Moran, 605 A.2d at 496 (acknowledging a defendant's right to waive a
trial and the trial court's role in determining whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived that right).
295. See supra section III.D.
296. See Franklin, 241 A.2d at 223 (citing Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942)).
297. See id.
298. Id.
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elements. 29 9 Thus, Judge Fortunato may not rely on Dunn's

waiver of jury trial to support his ineffectiveness argument.
Even assuming that Judge Fortunato could use Dunn's waiver
of a jury trial to support his ineffectiveness claim, his argument
would fail the first prong of the Franklin test. Dunn's waiver of a
jury trial is recorded proof that his waiver was freely and intelligently made.300 According to Rhode Island Superior Court Rule of
Criminal Procedure 23, a party must waive his right to a jury trial
in writing, in open court and with the approval of the court.30 ' In
addition, the party must knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
waive that right.30 2 Here, Dunn satisfied these requirements-he
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to a jury
trial in writing, in open court and with the approval of the court.303
Moreover, Judge Fortunato was at liberty to conduct as extensive
an inquiry as he deemed necessary to discern whether Dunn understood the consequences of this action.304 Nonetheless, Judge
299. Id.
300. See Defendant's Waiver of Jury Trial, State v. Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. June
23, 1997) (No. 96-1005A); State v. Moran, 605 A.2d 494, 496 (R.I. 1992) ("[The]
substantive right to invoke a bench trial belongs to the defendant and is subject
only to the procedural requirement that a trial justice determine that the defendant understands and accepts the consequences of executing a waiver."); State v.
DiStefano, 593 A.2d 1351 (R.I. 1991) ("The purpose of requiring a defendant to
execute a written waiver is both to ensure that the defendant is aware of the importance and the significance of the right he or she is waiving and to provide evidence of the defendant's consent.").
301. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 23.
302. See Moran, 605 A.2d 494, 496 (R.I. 1992). Rule 23 accomplishes two objectives. First, it ensures that the defendant is aware of the importance and significance of his decision by allowing the court to monitor the waiver and to intervene if
necessary. Second, Rule 23's "in writing" requirement creates a record that provides evidence of the defendant's consent. See Moran, 605 A.2d at 496 (discussing
Rule 23's procedural safeguards); State v. DiStefano, 593 A.2d 1351, 1352 (R.I.
1991); State v. Cruz, 517 A.2d 237, 243-44 (R.I. 1986). See generally R.I. Gen.

Laws § 12-17-3 (1956) (1994 Reenactment) (discussing the judge's special findings
and rulings required in a bench trial); MacFadyen & Hurst, supra note 67, § 23.3,
at 224 (stating that Rule 23 in effect allows the court to (1) monitor the waiver and
(2) intervene if necessary, and creates "a presumptively conclusive written record"
upon which to evaluate possible future claims that the waiver failed to meet the
stringent standards for waiving a constitutional right); Vealey Interview, supra
note 39 ("[So there was an open inquiry in the court regarding that mental capacity. And its required by the rules for the court to inquire of the defendant.").
303. See Defendant's Waiver of Jury Trial, Dunn (No. 96-1005A).
304. See State v. Feng, 421 A.2d 1258, 1267 (R.I. 1980); see also MacFadyen &
Hurst, supra note 67, § 23.3, at 224 (discussing the in-court procedure for waiving
one's right to a jury trial).
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Fortunato granted the waiver, thereby evincing his satisfaction
that Rule 23 procedure was observed. 30 5 Therefore, he cannot assert a post-hoc claim that Dunn's waiver was not freely or intelligently made after he tacitly found that Dunn's waiver was freely
and intelligently made at trial.
Judge Fortunato also fails the second prong of the Franklin
test because the waiver did not cause Dunn essential unfairness.
In light of the difficulty in obtaining an untainted jury for Count
One of the indictment, Vealey made a strategic choice, reasonable
under the circumstances, that Dunn should waive his right to a
jury trial for Count Two. 30 6 In cases where the jury pool may be

tainted, Rule 21(a) provides the defense attorney with the option of
making a motion to transfer the proceeding to another county
within the state. 30 7 Theoretically, by moving the proceeding to a
different county, the defendant will then obtain a jury pool unexposed to negative publicity. 30 8 Unfortunately for Dunn, such a
transfer would be useless because the negative publicity perme30 9
ated the entire state of Rhode Island.
305. See Defendant's Waiver of Jury Trial, Dunn (No. 96-1005A).
306. See id.
307. See R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 21(a) (stating that "[tihe court on motion of
the defendant shall transfer the proceedings as to the defendant to another county
whether or not such county is specified in the defendant's motion if the court is
satisfied that there exists in the county where the prosecution is pending so great a
prejudice against the defendant that he or she cannot obtain a fair and impartial
trial in that county") (emphasis added).
308. See State v. Burns, 84 A.2d 801, 802 (R.I. 1951).
309. See State v. Hightower, 661 A.2d 948, 956 (R.I. 1995).
It is conceded by counsel for defendant. . that the entire State of Rhode
Island had been covered by the Providence Journal and also by reports of
other elements of the media that blanketed this state. Consequently it
was extremely unlikely that any county outside the counties of Providence
and Bristol which are combined for purposes of juror selection) would
have produced an array of persons who would be less likely to have been
exposed to publicity than those of the most populated area from which the
jurors were actually selected.
Id.; Doane Hulick, Retired Priest, 75, Is Charged with Raping Girl in 1965, Prov. J.
Bull., Mar. 29, 1996, at B1, available in 1996 WL 9377811; Bob Kerr, Personal
Agonies Painfully Revealed, Eagerly Consumed, Prov. J. Bull., May 23, 1997, at
B1, available in 1997 WL 10833583; Mike Stanton, Woman Sues Priest, Says He
Fathered Child, Prov. J. Bull., May 23, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL
10833639. See generally Vealey Interview, supra note 39 ("We had ... I think
probably twenty [or] twenty two [potential jurors] that were dismissed because
they heard either the T.V. coverage, Mary Ann Sorrentino, had read the paper...
and then once the trial ended and the motion for acquittal [was granted] we had
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Judge Fortunato fails the third prong of the Franklin test.
The Rule 23 and Rule 21 arguments rebut Judge Fortunato's claim
that, because of Vealey's inexperience, the waiver of a jury trial
caused Dunn injustice. Judge Fortunato's claim therefore is not a
demonstrable reality. Rather, it is purely speculative. 3 10 Thus,
Judge Fortunato fails all three prongs of the Franklin test.
d. Dunn's Right to Testify
Dunn waived his right to testify in his own defense after discussing the consequences with Vealey. 3 11 When counseling Dunn
concerning whether he would testify, Vealey considered such factors as the strengths and weaknesses of the State's case and
whether Dunn's testimony would help the State's case or Dunn's
case.3 12 Concededly, a decision to waive testifying in one's own
defense is fraught with unexpected side-effects.3 13 However, if an
attorney reasonably concludes that it would not be in his client's
best interest to testify, then whether or not that decision is erroneous in hindsight should not create a justiciable issue.
State v. Welch 31 4 is illustrative of this point. In Welch, the
supreme court, supporting its decision that Welch's attorney had
not been ineffective, held that:
Trial counsel must make decisions of an almost infinite variety in the course of a criminal trial: whether to advise a plea
to a lesser offense; whether to object; whether to offer a witness of possible doubtful credibility[;] . . whether to advise the
extensive coverage for about two or three days .... So with all that kind of [publicity] it was tough enough to pick a jury for count number one.").
310. See State v. Franklin, 241 A.2d 219, 223 (R.I. 1968).
311. See State's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
47, State v. Dunn (R.I. Nov. 18, 1997) (No. 97-414 M.P.) ("Defense counsel is, of
course, obliged to inform his client of his right to take the stand. He may offer his
opinion on whether or not it would be wise to do so; so long as the final decision is
the client's, no basis for an ineffectiveness claim exists.") (citing State v. Camacho,
40 F.3d 349, 355 (11th Cir. 1994)). But see generally Respondent's Memorandum
in Support of Objection to Petition for Certiorari at 24, State v. Dunn (R.I. Feb. 16,
1998) (No. 97-414 M.P.) (stating that Vealey's alleged conflict of interest impaired
his ability to conduct an adequate defense).
312. See Vealey Interview, supra note 39 ("[Tihe general kinds of things you
would consider is the strengths or weaknesses of the state's case and are you going
to help the state or help yourself in terms of having your client testify.").
313. See State v. Welch, 330 A.2d 400, 401 (R.I. 1975) (citing Mitchell v. United
States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir. 1958)).
314. 330 A.2d 400.
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defendant to take the stand and subject himself to cross-examination .... All these and more are practical questions
and very real questions. Bad judgment, or even good but erroneous judgment, may result in adverse effects. These are
simple facts of trial; they are not justiciable issues. 3 16
Assuming arguendo that Vealey provided Dunn with erroneous advice regarding whether to waive his right to testify on his own behalf, Vealey's reasoning does not rise to the level of a justiciable
issue under Welch because such potential erroneous judgment is
simply a function of the unpredictability of a trial. Thus, Judge
Fortunato cannot use Dunn's right not to testify as a justification
3 16
for his ineffectiveness claim.
e. Vealey's Experience: There's a First Time for Everything
Judge Fortunato claimed that Vealey's inexperience resulted
in the failure to present character evidence supporting a recognized defense and influenced Vealey's advice to Dunn on whether
to waive a jury trial and take the stand.3 17 Judge Fortunato determined that while Vealey participated in a felony case in the 1980s,
he had never represented a person accused of a felony in a superior
court trial: "a capital case is simply no place for on-the-job training."3 18 The United States Supreme Court, however, disagrees
with this assertion. In United States v. Cronic,3 19 the court held
that an attorney's experience is relevant only if it provides insight
when a court evaluates his actual performance for ineffectiveness.
However, such experience does not justify a presumption that the
attorney was ineffective unless a court evaluates his actual per315. Welch, 330 A.2d at 401 (citing Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787
(D.C. Cir. 1958)).
316.

See U.S. Const. amend V. The right not to be compelled to be a witness

against oneself is the defendant's constitutional right. Thus, any violation of that
right must be raised by the defendant at the trial level. Judge Fortunato cannot
claim a violation of the defendant's right on the defendant's behalf. See supra section III.D. See generally McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970) (stating
that "a defendant's plea of guilty based on reasonably competent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the ground that counsel may have misjudged the
admissibility of the defendant's confession").
317. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 23 app. at 328, State v.
Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 1997) (No. 96-1005A).
318. Id. at 5 app. at 319.
319. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
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formance. 320 Cronic takes the view that a capital case is an appropriate place for on-the-job training absent court rules that state
otherwise. 3 21 Judge Fortunato therefore cannot deem Vealey ineffective per se simply because this was his first capital trial.
f.

The Court's Supervisory Powers: You Can't Always Get What
You Want

In order to ensure that defendants receive qualified legal representation in serious criminal cases, Cronic allows courts to use
their supervisory powers to create better safeguards. 3 2 2 Rhode Island's legislature, through section 8-6-2 of the Rhode Island General Laws, provided the appropriate means by which the superior
court may create better safeguards. 3 23 Thus, a majority of the superior court may amend or create a rule providing added safeguards for criminal defendants. In addition, the legislature, by
enacting section 10-9.1-1 of the Rhode Island General Laws, created the post-conviction relief proceeding. This statute provides
criminal defendants with an opportunity to redress constitutional
violations. A majority of the superior court has yet to create better
safeguards than those provided by the legislature in section 10-9.11. Until such time as a majority of the court drafts such changes,
Dunn may seek redress for ineffective assistance by seeking new
representation and pursuing a motion for post-conviction relief.
3.

The Ineffectiveness Claim Fails the Second Prong of the
Strickland Test

Even if the first component of the Strickland test is satisfied, a
party must satisfy the second component to set aside a judgement:
"a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional er324
rors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
320. See id. at 665 ("[Ineffectiveness does not arise necessarily because the] respondent's lawyer was young, that his principle practice was in real estate, or that
this was his first jury trial. Every experienced criminal defense attorney once tried
his first criminal case .... The character of a particular lawyer's experience may
shed light in an evaluation of his actual performance, but it does not justify a presumption of ineffectiveness in the absence of such an evaluation.").
321. See id. at 665 & n.38.
322. See id.
323. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-6-2 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
324. Brown v. Moran, 534 A.2d 180, 182 (R.I. 1987) (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Id.; see also State v. Brennan, 627 A.2d 842, 848 (R.I.
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Discovering Vealey's alleged lack of experience undermined Judge
Fortunato's confidence in his earlier verdict.325 Concededly, an attorney's ineffectiveness affects a defendant's ability to present
character evidence and effectively waive his constitutional rights:
"'[o]f all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most persuasive, for it affects his
ability to assert any other rights he may have."3 26 Only after an
intelligent waiver of a defendant's rights, with assistance from
counsel, is a defendant like Dunn provided with a fair trial.3 27 In
the present case, however, Vealey did not perform deficiently so as
to prejudice the defense. 328 His decisions were not unprofessional
errors, but rather represented strategic choices reasonable under
the circumstances. Such choices do not create a reasonable probability that, in their absence, the result of the proceeding would
have been different 3 29 because opening the door to bad-character
evidence, asking for a jury trial and testifying in his own defense
would very likely have left Dunn in a more precarious situation.
The facts of Dunn do not support Judge Fortunato's two
grounds for granting a new trial. Applying the newly-discovered
evidence test to Dunn, the alleged evidence of Dunn's good character, evidenced by the post-trial letters, was not newly discovered.
Additionally, Vealey performed effectively as required by both the
Rhode Island and federal constitutions. His performance passed
both prongs of the Strickland test and, as such, Judge Fortunato
1993) (stating that "[a n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does
not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no
effect on the judgment").
325. See Opinion Granting Motion for a New Trial at 30 app. at 331-32, State v.
Dunn (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 1997) (No. 96-1005A).
326. Brennan, 627 A.2d at 844 (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,
377 (1986)).
327. See generally Clark v. Ellerthorpe, 552 A.2d 1186, 1188 (R.I. 1989) (stating
that counsel's performance must be so deficient as to deprive the defendant of a
fair trial); Barboza v. State, 484 A.2d 881, 883 (R.I. 1989) (placing on the defendant
the burden of proving that his counsel's deficient performance deprived him of his
constitutional rights).
328. This is not a case where "some errors will have had a pervasive effect on
the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96,
329. See Clark, 552 A.2d at 1188 ("'Effective' does not mean successful. It
means conscientious, meaningful representation wherein the accused is advised of
his rights and honest, learned and able counsel is given reasonable opportunity to
perform the tasks assigned to him.") (quoting State v. Desroches, 293 A.2d 913,
916 (R.I. 1972)).
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should not have stamped Vealey with the label of ineffectiveness.
Therefore, neither ground warranted granting Dunn a new trial.
CONCLUSION

With the foregoing analysis as his shield, a textualist strikes
back against Judge Fortunato's public-policy interpretations. This
particular skirmish, however, will not settle the matter. Within
this country's courtrooms and law schools, judges, lawyers and law
students will continue the battle, defending their positions,
whether rooted in textualism or more policy-based interpretations.
Despite the fact that this Note and Judge Fortunato's August 6th
opinion differ in their respective positions, Judge Fortunato invites
public criticism of the reasoning given in support of his decision. 33 0
Accepting this invitation, this Note draws the following conclusions. Judge Fortunato should have denied Dunn's motion for a
new trial on the original grounds, and either request that Vealey
resubmit a motion with amended grounds or suggest post-conviction relief. Doing so would preserve the sanctity of Rhode Island's
statutes, the Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically Rule 33, as well as the balance of power between Rhode Island's judicial and legislative branches. Unfortunately for Judge
Fortunato, not only is he without power to grant a new trial sua
sponte but his substituted grounds for doing so are meritless. Accordingly, a motion for post-conviction relief will provide the defendant, the accused attorney and the prosecutor with particular
330. Judge Stephen J. Fortunate Jr., We Need An Independent Judiciary,Prov.
J. Bull., Feb. 5, 1998, at B6.
Of importance equal to the principle ofjudicial branch independence
is the guarantee of the First Amendment that people have the right to
criticize judges and their decisions. The tradition of criticizing judges is a
long one, and anyone reading Thomas Jefferson's criticisms of Chief Justice John Marshall and the early federal bench will see that his language
was anything but benign.
Public criticism of a judge's reasoning given in support of his or her
decision is not only lawful but healthy for democracy. Vicious, factually
unsupported attacks on the integrity of a judge are a different matter.
Whatever legal protection such comments may enjoy, the orderly and independent processes of a justice suffer because not only has an individual
judge's reputation been smeared, but the public has been deceived regarding the behavior of the people it expects to perform a fair and impartial
way. Put another way, public confidence, the foundation on which judicial
independence rests, is eroded.
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rights which will allow them to develop a full record for appellate
review.
Whether one defends textualism or advances public-policy interpretations, rules of criminal procedure remain an important device of our legal system. If the rules too heavily constrict a judge's
ability to ensure the integrity of the trial process, then they must
be amended not by a single judge, but rather by a majority of the
Rhode Island Superior Court.
Neal R. Pandozzi
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APPENDIX
Decision on Motion for a New Trial
Heard Before The Honorable
Mr. Justice Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr.
On August 6, 1997
Wednesday, August 6, 1997
Afternoon Session.

THE COURT: Let me begin with an observation, picking up
from what Mr. Prior's concluding remarks were relative to the
ordeal of the victim and her family. I have no doubt that the trial
process, for her and for people in similar situations, is an ordeal;
and I know of no one who is capable, so long as we preserve the
adversarial process, of eliminating some of that.
I do think what is lost in the discussions, sometimes in Court
and sometimes beyond the Courthouse, is what a trial is all about.
In the first place, when a trial gets under way, there is, in a legal
sense, no victim and there is no criminal; that's why a trial is conducted, to find out whether seated in the defendant's chair there is,
in fact, someone who engaged in criminal conduct.
A criminal trial has a limited objective and that is to determine whether the State produced enough credible evidence to satisfy the high burden of proof imposed by law. That burden of proof
is, of course, proof beyond a reasonable doubt which is also defined
as proof that satisfies the trier of fact to a near certitude that the
defendant committed the crime of which he or she is charged. See,
the United States Supreme Court decision In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, where the Supreme Court referred to a "subjective state of
certitude," and Jackson v. Virginia, 433 U.S. 307, where the
Supreme Court stated that for a conviction, the fact finder needs to
"reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the
accused."
The Supreme Court has never deviated from this standard,
and the Rhode Island Supreme Court has spoken in these terms,
as well, in Parkerv. Parker at 103 R.I. 435, page 442, a 1968 decision authored by Justice Kelleher.
The A.B.A. Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The Function of the Trial Judge, Standard 6-1.1 (a)
submits a narrow definition regarding the objective of a criminal
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trial: "The only purpose of a criminal trial is to determine whether
the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused as required
by law, and the trial Judge should not allow the proceedings to be
used for any other purpose." While this provision was still in draft
form, it was approved in the U.S. Supreme Court, case of Taylor v.
Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, in footnote 17. Not only is the objective of
a criminal trial a narrow one, the need for fairness in order to
reach a just outcome is overriding.
The United States Supreme Court spoke succinctly and eloquently on this point in Addington v. Texas, 434 U.S. 418 at pages
423 and 24: "In a criminal case," said the Supreme Court of the
United States, "the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards of proof designed
to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment. In the administration of criminal justice, our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself."
Our society's concern for a fair trial in order to reach a just
determination, one that is free of being a mistaken outcome, has
been so great, it is better to have ten guilty go free, than one innocent person be convicted. This is not some proverb that is tossed
around lightly. First found in Blackstone's Commentaries, an
eighteenth century law book used by the framers of our Constitution, more recently it was quoted in 1995, by our United States
Supreme Court in Schlup v. Delo at 115 S.Ct. 851, page 856, quoting: "The maxim of the law is, that it is better that 99 offenders
escape, than one innocent man be condemned."
In his concurring opinion in In re Winship, Justice Harlan referred to the maxim; and in our own Supreme Court, Justice Murray referenced it in State v. Paster, 524 A.2d 587. Justice Murray
wrote: "As John Adams pointed out over two centuries ago, under
our system ofjustice, it is far better to have many guilty persons go
free than to have one innocent person be wrongfully convicted."
She cited the Legal Papers of John Adams being his argument
for the defense in Rex versus Wemms, tried in 1770.
Thus, it can be seen that there is a narrow objective of a criminal trial, and that is to be adhered to so that a just result can be
achieved. That's the goal of the Court.
The narrow issue here, of course, was whether force was used
against Mary Ryan on one particular instance. The issue is not by
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any stretch of the imagination whether the defendant violated his
priestly vow of celibacy, nor was this criminal trial remotely connected to any civil dispute that may exist between the complaining
witness and the defendant, his Church superiors, the diocese of
Rhode Island, its Bishop, or any other person. What the Roman
Catholic Church should or should not do about priests engaging in
sexual conduct, criminal or otherwise, was not before this Court.
At the time I rendered my judgment of conviction, I learned
that counsel for the defendant had never before defended a person
accused of a felony in a Superior Court trial. I am not speaking
simply of capital cases; I'm speaking of all felonies. I explored this
matter further and can say unequivocally that defense counsel has
never defended anyone accused of a felony, in either a jury or a
nonjury case. He did, as we learned in the chamber's colloquies,
which were put on the record, participate in a felony case in the
early 1980's when he sat at counsel table for the Attorney General
in a trial. A capital case is simply no place for on-the-job training,
whatever the experience of the counsel may be in prior matters or
in other noncriminal matters, such as domestic cases, or civil
cases.
Shortly after the judgment was entered, I began receiving numerous letters submitted on behalf of Father Dunn. These letters
break roughly into several categories. In some of them, the writers
say they cannot believe that Father Dunn committed the crime.
Most of them, however, make a plea for leniency in sentencing, citing many praiseworthy and helpful things, according to them, that
he has done for his parish, the parishioners, and other people.
A number of letters, and these are the ones that raised concern
with myself, refer to specific character traits of Father Dunn, saying that he was gentle and kind, not a person to use force and violence, and some of these letters gave specific instances relative to
this trait.
I also received letters not favorable to Father Dunn. These
said, in effect, that he should be sentenced to the maximum allowed by law which, of course, is life in prison; that no consideration should be given to either his age or any redeeming qualities he
has, because in the view of these writers, he has none; that he was
a monster, and so on. One letter likened him to a Nazi war criminal that had finally been tracked down near the end of his life.
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All of these letters have been made available to both the State
and the defendant, with the exception of a few letters that have
trickled in over the pass few days. Judges regularly receive letters
prior to sentencing an individual, but the volume in this case is
certainly unique. I believe ninety to a hundred have been received,
thus far.
Some of the letters in support of Father Dunn provoke a serious and substantial legal concern, when it is also considered that
Father Dunn's trial attorney had no prior criminal defense experience in felony matters; and, indeed, this is not just any felony, this
is a complex case involving an incident from June of 1982, with no
reporting of the incident until some 12 or 13 years later; no corroborating medical evidence and so on, not that any is necessarily
required in such a case, but it boiled down to two people in a particular room at a particular time and that was it.
I say that there was a concern, when you couple the letters
and their content with the inexperience, because the letters contain a treasure trove of material of a type that could be placed
before a Court as evidence going to the presence or absence of
force. As an example, and again these letters have been made
available to both parties to this litigation, the State and to Father
Dunn, I'm going to refer to the letters simply by the initials of the
author; these letters will be put in a sealed envelope at the conclusion of this proceeding and will be available as part of the record if,
indeed, this matter proceeds to the Supreme Court.
One letter authored by someone with the initials M.B., the full
name was, of course, put in the letter, indicates that this individual, herself, is the parent of a sexual assault victim of some other
person. Quoting this person: "The defendant here is not a forceful
man. J.M. writes, June 25th, '97 letter, saying: "He's gentle, kind,
and generous." 6/25/97, R. and B.L., say: "Humble, kind, and very
generous." Our children grew up with him. Another woman wrote
indicating that she and her sisters, as teenage girls, worked at the
rectory with Father Dunn, quote: "He's nothing but a fine gentleman, always treating us with the utmost respect and consideration." P.B. wrote, "He helped me through a very difficult divorce
and series of other problems and has always been a complete gentleman. S.R. wrote: "Always respectful, loving, kind, and caring,"
and further, "In my years as a young widow, he never once made
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an attempt to seduce me or treat me with any disrespect in any
way."
I also received a letter from one of the witnesses who did testify in the case on behalf of Father Dunn, who, and this person who
has already made her presence public, Catherine Vincent wrote in
a July 17th, 1997 letter which was also turned over to the parties,
that she had hoped to have testified about the material I'm about
to read, but for some reason, wasn't asked about it, quoting, from
her letter: "In late autumn of 1993 when Mary," meaning Ryan,
"Mary first called me to tell me that she had been intimate with
Father Dunn, I didn't believe her because she had previously told
me that two other priests had sexually abused her. One of the
priests was in the Blue Army of Our Lady of Fatima. She told me
Father Dunn knew of this, that he knew the priest's name. The
second priest was her pastor at the time."
Now, I make no finding at this point whether that was whether that is true or not, but it is also well established that
prior, false accusations by a complainant in a matter like this can
also be brought before the Court. So my concern is: Why was this
not explored? Why was this not developed? Why was this not
presented or even considered for presentation? At the chamber's
conferences, ample opportunity was afforded the Attorney General,
defense counsel, and at one of the chamber's conferences, Mr.
Famiglietti, to make such representations or to ask such questions
of Mr. Vealey as they wished.
To elaborate further, the central question before the Court was
not whether Mary Ryan and Father Dunn ever had sexual intercourse, nor was the central question whether Father Dunn seduced
Mary Ryan into having sexual relations with him by using his
priestly role, his knowledge of her past problems, his age, and wit,
or any other means. Whether he was a rogue and a scoundrel betraying his priestly vow of celibacy, was never a determinative issue in this case. The central issue was: Whether on one occasion
he used force to bring about sexual penetration? And the context,
of course, was that this incident occurred after three or four years
of consensual sexual activity between Mary Ryan and Louis Dunn.
This sexual activity occurred several times a week; in fact, I
think some of the testimony may have been four or five times a
week, involving consensual oral sex and consensual digital penetration of the complainant by the defendant.
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With this as the factual background, I note that it has long
been an established principle of criminal law that a defendant can
introduce evidence of his character that would tend to contradict or
negate an element of a crime brought against him; or to put it another way, to indicate that given a particular character trait, it
would be improbable that the accused committed the crime with
which he or she was charged. Thus, someone accused of forgery or
embezzlement would introduce evidence of his or her nonviolent
and pacific disposition. The leading United States Supreme Court
on this point is Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 409, authored
by Justice Robert Jackson, a former United States Attorney General and United States prosecutor in the Neuremberg war crimes
trials. He wrote that this type of evidence is, "Sometimes valuable
to a defendant for this Court has held that such testimony alone, in
some circumstances, may be enough to raise a reasonable doubt of
guilt and that in the Federal Courts, a jury in a proper case should
be so instructed."
At the time Michelson was decided, only reputation evidence
was permitted, but the modern Rules of Evidence permits specific
act or instances showing the character trait, in addition to
reputation.
Rule 404(a) permits, quote, evidence of a "pertinent trait" of
the accused's character to be offered by the defendant. Of course, if
this is done, the prosecution is permitted to offer rebuttal testimony. Rule 405(b) permits reference to specific instances of a person's conduct as part of a defense in a criminal trial.
Our Supreme Court has expanded on the word "pertinent" and
said, quoting, "That for character evidence to be pertinent, some
nexus should exist between the particular evidence offered and the
crime charged." State v. Oliveira, 534 A.2d 867. In a case more
than 100 years old, the United States Supreme Court expounded
upon the proposition that the defendant could attack the State's
case by presenting character evidence of a pertinent trait. In Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361, at pages 366 and 367, the
Court adopted the language of an Illinois Supreme Court case:
"The more modern decisions go to the extent that in all criminal
cases, whether the case is doubtful or not, evidence of good character is admissible on the part of the prisoner. It is not proof of innocence, although it may be sufficient to raise a question of, or to
raise a doubt of guilt."
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In Edgington, the charge involved the making of a false statement in order to gain a benefit from the United States Government. The trial Judge excluded the defendant's proffer of evidence
calculated to show that the defendant had a reputation for truthfulness and veracity. The Supreme Court said that such evidence
must be permitted, regardless of whether the defendant himself
testified. And the Supreme Court also emphasized that the evidence must be permitted, regardless of whether the other evidence
in the case was strong or weak. The Court said, quoting, "The circumstances may be such that an established reputation for good
character, if it is relevant to the issue, would alone create a reasonable doubt, although without it the other evidence would be convincing." That's at page 471. The same may be said here, relevant
to available evidence on the issue of specific instances of nonviolence, or of a reputation for a gentle, nonviolent character.
What are the important facts here? We have a consensual sexual relationship for three or four years prior to the one incident in
question. We have a time span of more than 10 years between the
incident and it first being reported to law enforcement officials. On
the question of force, in addition to the incidents giving rise to the
criminal charge, Ms. Ryan had said the defendant had acted in a
forceful manner toward her on several other occasions.
At the trial, the defendant did not take the stand but
presented three witnesses on his behalf, each of whom testified approximately five minutes, conveying essentially the same message.
Taken all together, these three witnesses presented evidence that
Mary Ryan indicated she had a sexual relationship with Father
Dunn at sometime, but never indicated that any force had been
involved; that Mary Ryan was bold or flirtatious around Father
Dunn at the rectory; that she was friendly and affectionate towards Father Dunn; and that she, as she herself had testified, used
Father Dunn as her priest at her wedding some years after the
incident and, indeed, Father Dunn had given her away during that
ceremony.
The defense did not present any evidence whatsoever to rebut
the contention of the use of force during the incidents in question.
I referenced that in some detail during my decision referring to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court case of State v. Gabriau.
As I developed and explained in my decision at the conclusion
of the trial, Mary Ryan's testimony regarding the use of force on

324 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:253
the evening in question, stood uncontradicted and unimpeached.
It was not for me to say that a woman who had engaged in consensual oral sex for a three-year period, could not decline vaginal intercourse on the evening in question; similarly, on a theoretical
basis, one could argue that a person with a reputation for being
gentle and kind, which reputation was bolstered by specific instances of demonstrations of this character trait, would be unlikely
to use force in any encounter, including a sexual one, especially
when his sexual activities with the complaining witness had been
consensual for so long and on such a regular basis. However, the
operative word here is "theoretical," because the defendant failed
to produce this evidence, which evidence as I indicated, was readily
available to him and to his defense counsel. Whether people in
possession of such information would be credible at trial, and
would withstand cross-examination is, of course, another question,
but this was not appropriately investigated.
The A.B.A. standards to which I referred earlier, standard 44.1, speaks of the duty to investigate on the part of defense counsel: "It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation
of the circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading
to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the
event of the conviction ...
The duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of
facts constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead
guilty." This is an obligation imposed on people who would undertake to represent someone accused of a crime, especially a capital
crime. There was no such investigation in this case.
At one point during our colloquy in chambers, and the reason
why that colloquy was in chambers, although on the record and
will now have a sealed record, is that the questions and answers
come close to having an effect on the absolute lawyer-client privilege. So it was necessary for all persons, including myself as the
Judge, and the attorneys, to be extremely circumspect; nonetheless, some of the answers are telling, and they do not have any
impact upon the privilege.
One question that was put to defense counsel, was, "Did you
discuss with them," meaning people in the community, who, some
of whom were being interviewed on behalf of the defendant, my
question was, "Did you discuss with them, his reputation within
the community for nonviolence or peacefulness?" Answer: "I don't
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believe I directly asked that question of the persons I was interviewing, but there was some indications from those persons as to
what the kind of person he was and his character." "Did you discuss with these people, any particular instances that they knew of,
regarding Father Dunn, relative to his being a pacific, kindly, gentle type of individual?" The answer: "I don't believe we had discussions of particular instances. No."
There was also colloquy about whether the defense, at the
time of trial, on the eve of trial, involving Mary Ryan as the complaining witness, and also at the conclusion of the State's case,
whether the defense was in the possession of any information that
they believed the State could use to contradict character witnesses.
It turned out that during the course of discovery, several
names had been provided to the defense. No effort was made to
contact these people. There was no investigation. And in one case,
a further problem of considerable magnitude surfaces, and that is,
the problem of a conflict of interest on the part of defense counsel.
The Court asked defense counsel: "Did you ever contact any of the
people, the names of whom were given to you by the State, such as
Phyllis Huttnack?" I mention her name in these proceedings because she has been referred to in open Court during other aspects
of this matter by the State and the defense and came forward to
offer herself as a witness. In any event, the question was: "Did
you ever contact any of the people, the names of whom were given
to you by the State, such as Phyllis Huttnack?" The answer: "No, I
didn't. She is also a plaintiff in a civil lawsuit against Monsignor
Dunn, so I wouldn't be able to contact her."
There is a conflict of interest in which the attorney is putting
his concerns, albeit legitimate ones, that he conduct himself in a
fair and professional way in a civil trial, above the interests of the
defendant in this criminal trial, to have every possible avenue, reasonable avenue, explored and investigated.
The Supreme Court of the United States said, in Culyer v. Sullivan at 446 U.S. 335, page 350, that an "actual conflict," and here
we have a conflict that is acknowledged by defense counsel, "that
has an adverse effect on the performance," - here we have the
failure to investigate - "creates a problem of constitutional magnitude and has an impact relative to rights secured by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution."
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It would also have an impact relative to Article 1 Section 10 of
the Rhode Island Constitution, which addresses the same problem,
the right to assistance of counsel. It's not just the right counsel.
It's the right to have the assistance of counsel. Counsel has to be
doing something not only at the trial, but prior to the trial during
the investigative phase. And while it is true that defense counsel
here did consult with a seasoned defense attorney during the
course of this trial, as I understand the representations of both Mr.
Vealey and Mr. Famiglietti, that can cut two ways: On the one
hand, it's good to talk about - for counsel to talk about cases and
to explore ideas as one goes forward; on the other hand, a trial by
remote, is not acceptable relative to the integrity of the process. It
may be all well and good for a movie star to fly a plane, listening to
information - who has never flown a disabled plane before, getting signals from and advice from somebody back at the tower, but
that is not the way to conduct a criminal trial.
In United States v. Cronic, at 466 U.S. 648, United States
Supreme Court said, as I believe Mr. Prior earlier referenced, that
the lack of experience by itself does not lead irresistibly to the conclusion that the defendant has been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel in the constitutional sense. This seems to be logical
in an elementary sense, in that, just as inexperience does not necessarily lead to ineffectiveness, experience does not always mean
that the defense will be effective.
Although it is interesting to think of Justice Holmes' famed
aphorism that, to paraphrase, the lifeblood of the law is not logic,
but experience. The Supreme Court, however, in Cronic made it
very clear, that all it was concerned about in that case was the
Sixth Amendment effectiveness claim. And it deferred to the
states to set appropriate standards, should they so choose,
designed to improve the administration of justice, which put another way, of course, means a design to bring about as many just
results as possible and to eliminate as much error and mistaken
decisions as possible. That's at page 65 of the Cronic case.
Toward that end, our judicial system, through Executive Order No. 95-02, issued by Chief Justice Joseph Weisberger on April
7th, 1995, makes it very clear that there are minimum criteria an
attorney must have if he or she is to undertake a representation of
a person in a capital or major felony case. The standards were
promulgated in order to ensure that indigent defendants who, for
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some reason, were not entitled to the services of the Public Defender, would receive appointed counsel who had experience with
the type of matters which they were called upon to serve.
At page 2 of that Executive Order, as a prerequisite, the Chief
Justice declared that there must be an annual completion of six
hours of Continuing Legal Education in Criminal Law and Procedure, a criteria not met by defense counsel here; must be a member
of the Rhode Island bar for at least three years, which of course,
defense counsel meets; and then, prior representation of any party
in at least three Class 1 felony trials, that is cases carrying with
them penalties of more than 10 years in jail, all the way to verdict;
or, prior representation of any party in at least three Class 1 felony
trials to verdict, as an associate counsel under the supervision of a
mentor attorney.
What does this failure to meet this criminal criteria mean in a
practical sense? And I'm well aware that it was designed to deal
with the problem referenced; that is, the indigent person who
doesn't qualify for representation by the Public Defender. What
does this failure mean in this case? It meant that when Father
Dunn was confronted with the question of whether to proceed to
trial in front of a jury or waive that historic right, he was counselled by an attorney who had no experience whatsoever in making
that decision, and indeed, no experience, whatsoever, in presenting
a felony criminal case in front of either a Judge or a jury.
It meant that when Father Dunn was called upon to make the
decision that many commentators considered to be one of the most
important decisions of a person accused of a crime, whether to take
the witness stand or not, Father Dunn was counselled by someone
who had no experience, whatsoever, in assessing such a situation,
and it also means that when the State finished the presentation of
his case, and the testimony of Mary Ryan stood, essentially, uncontradicted and unimpeached, the defendant did nothing to undermine any of the material elements of the State's case. As I
previously indicated, there existed a considerable amount of material that could have been marshaled for the record against the element of force. And we heard the representation of Mr. Famiglietti,
which confirmed what counsel said yesterday in chambers: Mr.
Vealey, that is, that on these points, he was essentially at the controls himself.
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The oath a Judge takes requires the Judge to be no respecter
of persons to dispense justice fairly and evenly, regardless of
whether the person is rich or poor. And that's what the oath says:
Rich or poor. You could apply black or white, a priest, an atheist,
college professor, or an unemployed migrant worker.
Here, there is an anomaly. The poor person receives the institutional solicitude of the Court but the nonindigent, though, of
course, not necessarily rich, gets no such protection. It is not my
prerogative to amend the Executive Order, but I do have an obligation to make further inquiry when the information I have discussed is brought to my attention; that is what I have attempted to
do here.
I know that an argument was made, a vigorous argument by
Mr. Prior, that this is an inappropriate time to raise this issue. He
argues that our statute on postconviction relief creates, if I understand his argument correctly, the only possible vehicle for raising
the ineffective counsel issue and that a Judge cannot do it on his or
her own; clearly, this, as a general proposition, cannot be true. If
an attorney came into this courtroom and was floundering around
because of some sickness, or perhaps the abuse of some substance,
alcohol, or drugs, the Court, to protect the integrity of the process,
would be duty bound to intervene.
I will discuss that in greater detail, or at least give a cite to a
thorough discussion of this problem in a moment.
So what is a trial Judge to do if it becomes apparent to him
that the defense counsel has had no prior experience in representing people accused of felonies, let alone capital ones, and that this
experience caused the defendant to forego the presentation of evidence supporting a long-recognized defense, and that this inexperience also infused advice given on two strategic points: The waiver
of a jury, and a decision not to take the stand. See pages 11 and 12
of the transcript developed yesterday.
The United States Supreme Court said nearly three decades
ago, "That Judges should strive to maintain proper standards of
performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in
criminal cases in their Courts." If I understood - that's McMann
v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, decided in 1970. If I understood
Mr. Prior's argument, no matter what I observe in the domain of
"ineffective," I am to sit by, passively. I do not believe that is the
role of a trial Judge.
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The tenor of the remark I just read from McMann v. Richardson, found its way into A.B.A. Standard 6-1.1, quoting, "The adversary nature of the proceeding does not relieve the trial Judge of the
obligation of raising on his or her initiative at all appropriate times
and in an appropriate manner, matters which may significantly
promote a just determination of the trial."
The entire question of judicial intervention to ensure a fair
trial and a just outcome, was insightfully discussed in a law review
article by a distinguished Federal Judge who wrote from a concern
that a number of the defendants appearing before him, were not
properly represented. The article is entitled Dealing With Incompetent Counsel - The Trial Judge's Role, by Judge William
Schwarzer at 93 Harv. L. Rev. 663; that article, by the way, was
cited in Cronic, by the United States Supreme Court.
I'm aware, as I said, that claims of ineffective counsel are generally to be raised in an application for postconviction relief
brought under Rhode Island's controlling statutes on that topic.
See Rhode Island General Law 10-9.1-1. I'm also mindful of the
authorities I've cited thus far, and I am not aware of any authority
which directs that a trial Judge should not raise a matter that has
a significant impact on the integrity of the trial process and calls
into question the reliability of the verdict. The contrary is true.
The Judge's overriding responsibility is to ensure the integrity of
the trial process.
The reason for having this claim raised generally in postconviction relief motions is to enable the trial judge to conduct a hearing. More often than not, on direct appeal, there would not be a
sufficient - there would not be sufficient evidence on the record to
allow the Appellate Court to responsibly consider an ineffectiveness claim. There are, of course, exceptions to this. Sometimes the
record is abundantly clear and the postconviction relief vehicle
need not be employed. This is true in a number of the Federal Circuits, including the First Circuit, the circuit in which we are. See,
United States v. Natanel at 938 F.2d 302, decided in 1991. Where
as here, a trial Judge learns of the total inexperience of the attorney in criminal felony trials, and also becomes aware of the readily
available material that could have been used as evidence, but was
not presented, or even reasonably investigated or considered to be
presented, on behalf of the defendant, the trial Judge can intervene sua sponte, so long as a record is developed that can inform
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the Appellate Court, if that becomes necessary, as to why the trial
Judge acted the way he or she did. And that is why we have a
record in this case, as to the background and the concerns of the
Court regarding this, at which time the attorneys involved could,
where appropriate, be questioned or where appropriate, ask
questions.
This having been said, what standards should be applied in
determining whether the verdict should be set aside? On more
than one occasion, our Supreme Court has provided guidance in
this area and its doctrinal declarations have been refined as recently as last month. In Mastracchiov. Moran, decided July 22nd,
1997, our Supreme Court referred once again to the, "significantchance doctrine," and determined that when post-trial evidence
surfaces, quoting: "In order to obtain relief from the jury's verdict"
- just a moment, please - (Pause) - Their quote is that "In order
to obtain relief from the jury's verdict, although not required to
show the probability of a different verdict upon retrial, the defendant is required to show that there would be a significant chance
that the use and development of the post-trial discovered evidence
would have produced a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough
jurors to avoid conviction."
In Mastracchio, the Supreme Court said that another inquiry
that must be determined is whether the previously undisclosed
facts, 'Would in any legal sense, be sufficient and material so as to
serve to undermine the confidence in the jury trial's verdict or raise
any reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different." Seven days after its decision in Mastracchio, the Supreme
Court in Broccoli v. Moran, phrased the question as: "A trial justice called upon to review the evidence on an application for postconviction relief, need not determine whether there was sufficient
evidence to convict absent the discounted evidence, but must, instead, determine whether the previously undisclosed favorable evidence puts the case in such a different light as to undermine
confidence in the verdict"; page 13. This approach dovetails with
the thinking of the United States Supreme Court in the Edgington
case that I discussed earlier, and also, in the more recent case of
Kyles v. Whitley, decided in 1995, which by the way, was referenced
in at least one of the Supreme Court cases of Rhode Island I just
referred to. At page - Kyles v. Whitley is at 131 L Ed 2d, 490 page
506: The Court cites Stricklandv. Washington, the leading case on
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effectiveness of counsel. Kyles v. Whitley dealt with the improper
holding back of evidence by the prosecution. There's absolutely
nothing like that in this case. That's not what this case is about;
however, the standards used are the exact same. The standard, if
the evidence has either been withheld improperly by the prosecution, or if it has not been presented because of the ineffectiveness of
counsel, the standards are the same.
The Supreme Court quoted other cases for its general proposition, quoted the Agurs case, which it said quoting, "rejected a standard that the evidence if disclosed probably would have resulted in
acquittal."
The Court went on to say, "The question is not whether the
defendant would have more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict
worthy of confidence." That is the issue here. Can I, as the fact
finder, have confidence in this verdict, under the Supreme Court
standards and the authorities in both Rhode Island and the United
States that I have quoted. Related to this doctrine is our Supreme
Court's awareness that the trial counsel, in order to effectively use
the evidence to even be aware of its value, must have some skills in
the area.
Less than a year ago, on November 4 the, 1996, in the
Supreme Court decision of State v. Toro, 95-622, Supreme Court
number, the Supreme Court said: "The defendant must show there
is a significant chance that the use and development of the withheld evidence by skilled counsel at trial would have produced a
reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a conviction." Here, of course, we do not have a jury but the reference, of
course, is to skilled trial - skilled counsel. Some indication that
the attorney involved should have some skills with the matter at
hand. This issue, let me stress, is not whether Mr. Vealey is a fine
and excellent lawyer in Family Court matters or in civil cases. The
issue here is: What about a criminal case? Indeed, a capital criminal case? There are fine eye doctors, ophthalmologists who operate
on the eye with great success, but they are not utilized to perform
open heart surgery, and one does not call the TV expert to repair
the refrigerator.
In referencing State v. Toro, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island was citing the earlier cases of State v. Burke, and In re
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Ouimette. Here, as the fact finder in this case, my confidence in the
verdict I earlier rendered has been undermined by the discovery
that inexperienced counsel failed to present readily obtainable evidence on the issue of force, in defense of a charge where force is a
material element.
He also presumed to counsel the defendant relative to waiving
fundamental Constitutional rights without having any significant
prior experience in the practical application of these rights, indeed,
any experience whatsoever. I speak, of course, of the right to a jury
trial and the right to testify and the concomitant right to remain
silent. The undermining of this confidence must be placed in context. Charge was brought more than a decade after the incident
occurred. For three or four years prior to the incidents, the complaining witness and the defendant regularly engaged in intimate
sexual activity, including oral-genital contact and digital penetration of the female. After the incident, the complaining witness invited the defendant to perform her marriage ceremony and to give
her away during that ceremony.
For that reason, and as I have stated and want to emphasize,
the only vehicle for considering this issue was not postconviction
relief, but for the reasons stated above may be done at this juncture of the proceedings. I think, logically, it must be asked: How
can the trier of fact impose a sentence if confidence in the verdict
has been undermined?
Rule 33, which is the rule that brings us before the Court, permits the trial Judge who has conducted a trial without a jury, to
set aside the verdict and then take new evidence; however, the context of this case makes that solution to the problem not an apt one,
if the goal, as I said, is and must be, the conduct of a fair trial that
reaches a just result.
So for that reason, I am granting the motion. I am awarding a
new trial, and in the meanwhile, or at this moment, will now hear
counsel on the question of bail.

